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I. INTRODUCTION
Promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code1 offered
our nation's legal and business communities the hope of a sys-
tem that would "simplify, clarify and modernize the law gov-
erning commercial transactions. '2 Article 9 of the Code, for
example, is a lucid realization of this hope. In framing Article
9, the draftsmen abandoned a body of inconsistent, anachronis-
tic laws governing security interests in personal property and,
starting virtually from scratch, tailored a new system of priori-
ties.3 These priorities reflect the draftsmen's careful balancing
of society's interest in commercial efficiency against their own
interest in protecting the public from overreaching. In 1972, af-
ter observing the operation of these new rules for several years,
the draftsmen revised Article 9 to comport more closely with
the requirements of current commercial practice.4 As a result
1. The Uniform Commercial Code will hereinafter be referred to either as
the Code or as the U.C.C. Citations are to the 1978 Official Text of the U.C.C.
The organizations that sponsor the writing and revision of the U.C.C. are the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.
2. U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (a). Another purpose of the U.C.C. is "to make uni-
form the law among the various jurisdictions." Id. § 1-102(2) (c).
3. Pre-U.C.C. security devices included pledges, chattel mortgages, condi-
tional sales, trust receipts, factor's Hens, and field warehousing. The terms, sys-
tems of priorities, and necessity for filing these devices varied widely among
jurisdictions. Article 9 established one type of security interest with a uniform
system of priorities. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
754-57 (1972).
4. In 1966, the Permanent Editorial Board (established by the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws) submitted a report which pointed out that since the approval of Article 9
in 1952, there had been 337 nonuniform amendments. The Article 9 Review
Committee, established in response to this report, worked on amending Article
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of this extensive revision, businesses can now predict with cer-
tainty the consequences of different courses of action.
Article 3 of the Code governs commercial paper, and Arti-
cle 4 controls the bank collection process. Their lack of clarity
often makes the planning of commercial transactions difficult.
Unfortunately, the draftsmen of the Code had no similar impe-
tus to start from scratch in designing these provisions. Appar-
ently, the draftsmen were of the opinion that the rules codified
in the earlier Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.)5 worked well
enough. Rather than attempting wholesale revision of the
N.I.L., therefore, they sought merely to modify its language,
resolving only those questions on which the courts had seri-
ously differed.6 Because the current provisions of Articles 3
and 4 more or less restate the traditional rules of commercial
paper, they fail to accommodate the new or innovative uses of
commercial paper required by our modern economy. Further
compounding the inadequacy of Articles 3 and 4 is their fre-
quent lack of coordination; this problem stems from the fact
that the two articles were drafted by separate groups of schol-
ars and businessmen.7
9 until October 1970, when it submitted a report to the Editorial Board. A final
report was sent to the sponsoring organizations in 1971, and Article 9, as
amended, was approved and published in 1972. Since then, it has been enacted
in twenty-one jurisdictions. See Explanation to Revised Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 3 UNnFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) 3 (1979 Pam-
phlet).
5. The NI.L., which first codified the law of negotiable instruments, was
enacted between 1890 and 1937 by all 48 of the then-existing states, and by the
territories of Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Although the purpose of the
N.I.L. was to establish uniform law among the states, diverse judicial interpre-
tations of its provisions destroyed any semblance of uniformity. The U.C.C. has
now superseded the N-.L. in all states. See Note, Blocking Payment on a Certi-
fied, Cashier's, or Bank Check, 73 MICH. L. REv. 424, 430 n.46 (1974).
6. Karl N. Llewellyn, Chief Reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code,
pointed out that the revision of the NI.L. was to a great degree one of form
rather than substance. Article 3 "concisely states the better case law under the
NIJ., cures a few old blobs, and rounds out and clears up operating ques-
tions." Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FiA. L.
REV. 367, 380 (1957).
7. Each article was initially delegated to one or two draftsmen, who were
consulted by different advisory groups. The principal draftsman for Article 3
was William L. Prosser, while the principal draftsman for Article 4 was Fairfax
Leary, Jr. J. WnrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 3. As drafts of each article
were prepared, they were reviewed and revised by the central drafting staff and
by various committees of the sponsoring organizations. See note 1 supra. Re-
views were made on a section-by-section basis. It was not until 1949 that the
articles were combined and reviewed as a code. By this time, some of the arti-
cles had already received votes of tentative approval by the sponsoring organi-
zations. See Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code: An Experiment in
Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A.J. 419 (1950).
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One of the major problems shared by both Articles 3 and 4
is their failure to establish separate rules for the various types
of commercial paper.8 This is most evident from the lack of
specific provisions recognizing and treating bank checks. This
Article analyzes the problems created by the application of cur-
rent Code provisions to bank checks. It examines the need in
our economy for a negotiable instrument that can serve as a
cash substitute, and suggests that. the Code be amended to en-
sure that at least one type of bank check-the cashier's check-
be allowed to serve this role.
I. THE MODERN USE OF BANK CHECKS
A. THE ROLE OF BANK CHECKS
In our economy, there are essentially two classes of checks
in general use. The first consists of ordinary personal checks,
which are those drawn upon a bank by a person or entity other
than a bank.9 Banks are not liable on these checks unless they
accept'0 or pay them." The second class is comprised of cash-
ier's, certified, and teller's checks, which collectively are known
as bank checks. A cashier's check is a check drawn by a bank
upon itself, a certified check is a personal check that a bank has
accepted, and a teller's check is a check drawn by one bank-
usually a savings and loan association-upon another bank.12
Both personal and bank checks serve primarily as vehicles for
transferring funds. They are intended to be used as means for
making immediate payment, not as credit devices or evidence
8. Another deficiency of Article 3 is the absence of rules allocating the
loss attributable to negligent behavior in commercial transactions. Under Arti-
cle 3's negligence provisions, it is not clear whether contributory negligence is a
defense, or what types of negligence preclude recovery and what circumstances
are sufficient to justify such preclusion. See Farnsworth & Leary, U.C.C. Brief
No. 10: Forgery and Alteration of Checks, 14 PRAc. LAw. 75 (Mar. 1968). More-
over, it is not clear whether U.C.C. § 3-406--the basic provision governing negli-
gence-either provides a cause of action against a negligent drawer or protects
the taker of paper bearing a forged indorsement. See Palizzi, Forgeries and
Double Forgeries Under Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 659
(1969). In addition, Article 3 fails to clarify the right of an accommodation party
to raise the accommodated party's defenses. See J. WHrrE & R. SumMERs, supra
note 3, at 442-43; Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833 (1968).
9. U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (b).
10. Id. § 3-409(1).
11. Id. § 4-213(1).
12. Only the drawer bank is liable on a teller's check unless the drawee
bank has accepted it. Id. § 3-409(1).
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of indebtedness.' 3 Their common advantage over cash is that
they enable parties to transfer funds with less risk of theft or
other loss.
Certain risks, however, prevent personal checks from serv-
ing as true cash substitutes. One risk is that a buyer of goods
who pays by check may not have adequate funds to cover the
check. This risk can be called the "risk of insolvency."14 A sec-
ond risk is that a buyer who pays by personal check may stop
payment on the check, or may in some other way persuade the
bank upon which the check is drawn to resist payment. The
seller must then bring a lawsuit to recover the payment owed.
This situation not only requires the seller to expend funds for
litigation, but also deprives him of the use of funds during the
pendency of the action. This risk can be termed the "risk of lit-
igation."' 5
These risks give rise to a variety of costs. The costs ab-
sorbed by sellers who take bad checks are passed on to the
public in the form of higher prices. Banks also bear certain
costs associated with these risks; they must employ more
clerks to handle the problems created by stop payment orders.
In addition, should a bank fail to comply ivith a timely and
proper stop order, it will suffer an additional loss if it is unable
to recover the funds it paid to the holder. These extra costs to
banks are reflected in higher prices for maintaining checking
accounts. Despite these risks and accompanying costs, per-
13. In Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co. v. Brown, 141 So. 436 (La. App. 1932),
the court observed,
There is a difference between a check and a promissory note. A check
represents money and is merely the vehicle or means of delivery of the
money. Whereas, a note is a written engagement or promise to pay a
certain sum of money at a time specified. It is the evidence of an obli-
gation to pay.
Id. at 439.
14. The risk of insolvency gives rise to a substantial cost. Whenever a
seller does not receive payment for goods because of a buyer's insolvency, the
cost of these goods must be absorbed into overhead and spread over the price
of the remaining goods.
15. By paying with a check, the buyer may shift the burden of commencing
an action to the holder without incurring any penalty for this imposition. Since
our legal system does not tax the losing party with the attorney's fees of the
prevailing party, the seller bears this expense even if successful. The shifting
of these risks is a powerful weapon that often causes the buyer to obtain an
undeserved favorable settlement. If a buyer has a legitimate reason for stop-
ping payment on a check, however, the seller would probably still have had to
incur these costs even if the buyer had paid cash, since the buyer would have
sued the seller. But, if a buyer's basis for suit is questionable, he probably will
not undertake the expense of commencing legal proceedings if he has already
paid in cash.
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sonal checks are widely used. Businesses generally accept per-
sonal checks, and most markets are elastic enough to permit
the incremental raising of prices necessary to cover their costs.
Frequently, however, a seller who is particularly risk
averse is unwilling to participate in a transaction involving pay-
ment by personal check. And, under certain circumstances, the
market simply cannot bear the increased costs associated with
the use of personal checks. For instance, a seller may not wish
to assume the risk of litigation or of insolvency when a transac-
tion involves the sale of real estate or of a business. Yet, for
the same transaction, a buyer may not wish to assume the risk
of theft or of other loss that accompanies the use of cash.
Clearly, this situation calls for a viable cash substitute that mit-
igates these risks for both parties.
Two often-advanced possibilities, credit cards and elec-
tronic funds transfer systems, are inadequate for this purpose.
Credit card companies assume certain transactional risks, but
they charge sellers for the service. Sellers, in turn, pass on this
charge to buyers in the form of higher prices.16 Electronic
funds transfer systems, however, are ideally suited to eliminat-
ing these risks. These systems simultaneously credit the
seller's and debit the buyer's bank accounts. 17 Unfortunately,
this method of transferring funds appears to be years away
from nationwide implementation.18
16. See Cleveland, Bank Credit Cards: Issuers, Merchants, and Users, 90
BANKING L.J. 719 (1973). Credit card companies usually charge retailers be-
tween three and six percent of the amount of the purchase. Retailers must in-
clude the charge levied by credit card companies in their operating costs. See
O'Driscoll, The American Express Case: Public Good or Monopoly?, 19 JJ. &
ECON. 163 (1976). For a discussion of the mechanics of credit card use, see
Comment, The Applicability of the Law of Letters of Credit to Modern Bank
Card Systems, 18 U. KAN. I. REV. 871, 873-75 (1970).
17. For a more detailed explanation of electronic funds transfer systems,
see J. WHrrE, BANKING LAw-TEAcHING MATERIALs 700-14 (1976).
18. The implementation of point of sale terminals (POSTs), one of the
more sophisticated forms of electronic funds transfer systems (EFTs), appears
to be years away not for technological reasons-the basic technology is already
in place-but, rather, because of complex legal and economic problems.
POSTs, operated in conjunction with automated clearing houses (ACHs),
would handle all credit transactions between the participating merchants in a
certain region and the banks that have joined together to supply that region's
ACH. Although it was once proposed that EFTs generally be treated as elec-
tronic mailboxes, courts have begun to view EFT terminals operated by nation-
ally chartered banks as branch offices subject to state branch banking
regulations. Woodruff, Electronic Funds Transfer in the Bank Card Industry,
1977 WAsH. U. L.Q. 501, 503-05. The Independent Bankers Association of
America (IBAA)-a trade association whose membership is comprised of about
fifty percent of the commercial banks in the United States-strongly opposes
implementation of EFTs. The IBAA is made up of locally-owned rural and sub-
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Bank checks, therefore, seem best able to serve as cash
substitutes. Since the public already perceives bank checks as
the equivalent of cash, there is no need to educate the public
regarding their use. Moreover, the use of bank checks avoids
the risk of theft or other loss inhering in the use of cash, and
obviates the risk of insolvency that accompanies the use of per-
sonal checks, since there is little risk of a bank becoming insol-
vent.19 And, even if a bank insolvency were to occur, most
banks are covered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, which insures the full amount of most bank checks.20
Under the current provisions of Articles 3 and 4, however,
the use of bank checks entails a serious risk of litigation. The
provisions of the Code do not specifically address bank
checks.21 But the general provisions of the Code on negotiable
instruments, if applied to transactions involving bank checks,
appear to permit the assertion of a variety of claims to and de-
fenses against them.22 If a bank decides to utilize one or more
urban banks, and excludes banks and corporations controlled by multi-bank
holding companies. The goal of the IBAA is to increase government regulation
of banking so that the operation of free competition does not result in the con-
centration of deposits in a few large national banks. See Peterson, Electronic
Funds Transfer and the Small Bank, 1977 WAsH. U. LQ. 513, 513. A second
problem with EFTs concerns their treatment under federal antitrust laws. The
operators of ACHs, who will always be some combination of competing banks,
may have to share the service with other competitors if it is the only system
available. Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (news gath-
ered by and distributed among Associated Press members cannot be withheld
from nonmembers). The Justice Department, however, has advised the or-
ganizers of at least one EFT--which would have represented eighty percent of
the deposits in the state of Nebraska-that the system may constitute a monop-
oly in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). See Wood-
ruff; supra, at 505. For a detailed examination of the antitrust implications
raised by EFTs, see Ubell, Electronic Funds Transfer and Antitrust Laws, 93
BANaKNG LJ. 43, 51-81 (1976).
19. The number of bank failures has decreased dramatically since the De-
pression. Between 1930 and 1932, there were more than 5,100 bank failures, but
between 1973 and 1975 there were only twenty-three. E. FARswoRTH, CAsEs
AND MATERIALS ON COMMERcIAL PAPE_ 235 (2d ed. 1976). See also J. WnrrE,
supra note 17, at 715.
20. The holders of certified, cashier's, and teller's checks are considered
depositors of the bank and, therefore, are covered by FDIC insurance to a max-
imum amount of $40,000. 12 C.F.R. § 330.11 (1979).
21. The one exception is the Code's treatment of certified checks, which
are specifically covered by several provisions, including U.C.C. §§ 3-410, 3-411,
and 3-418. The Code's only reference to cashier's checks is in U.C.C. § 4-
211(1) (b), see note 32 infra, and its only significant reference to teller's checks
is in U.C.C. § 4-104(1) (e), which defines "customer" to include one bank carry-
ing an account with another. This reference seems to indicate that teller's
checks are to be treated similarly to ordinary personal checks except for the
fact that the drawer is a bank.
22. See U.C.C. §§ 3-305, -306.
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of these claims or defenses to resist payment on its own bank
check, the check holder must commence a legal action for pay-
ment. This situation prevents bank checks from offering the
finality of cash payments, and thus deprives them of their role
as cost-effective cash substitutes.
Commentators discussing the rights of bank check obligors
have focused mainly on the problem of determining when these
obligors may resist payment under the provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.23 These commentators have failed,
however, to examine the appropriate role of bank checks in our
economy, and the question of whether treating them under the
existing provisions of the Code strips them of their independ-
ent function as cash substitutes. Cashier's checks and certified
checks are well suited to serve as cash substitutes. Given the
business community's need for such an instrument, there is no
reason why these checks should not be permitted to fill this
role. Teller's checks, however, are probably better left to serve
as the personal checks of banks.
The Code should therefore be amended to accommodate
the appropriate role of cashier's and certified checks. The
draftsmen should establish a comprehensive set of rules per-
mitting no defenses against cashier's and certified checks other
than forgery and alteration. Allowing only these defenses is
necessary if these checks are to have any advantage over
cash.24 Permitting other defenses or claims unnecessarily im-
poses on the use of bank checks substantially the same costs
that are inherent in the use of personal checks. It is the addi-
23. See generally 6D W. WILLER & F. HART, BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMER-
CIL CODE SERVICE § 4-403, at 2-1194 (1978); Benson, Stop Payment of Cashier's
Checks and Bank Drafts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 OBo N. L
REV. 445 (1975); Fox, Stopping Payment on a Cashier's Check, 19 B.C. L REV.
683 (1978); Wallach, Negotiable Instruments: The Bank Customer's Ability to
Prevent Payment on Various Forms of Checks, 11 IND. L REV. 579 (1978); Note,
Personal Money Orders and Teller's Checks: Mavericks Under the U.C.C., 67
COLuM. L. REV. 524 (1967); Note, supra note 5, at 424, Note, Adverse Claims and
the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protection Available?, 67 Nw. U. L REV. 915
(1973). But see Comment, The Rights of a Remitter of a Negotiable Instrument,
8 B.C. INDus. & COM. L REV. 260 (1967).
24. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is an interesting question
whether the U.C.C.'s allocation of the risk of loss for forgery and alteration, set
forth in U.C.C. §§ 3-419, 3-406, 3-417, and 4-207, is consistent with the use of bank
checks as cash equivalents. It is clear that these rules of allocation, which pro-
tect against the risks of loss and theft, provide bank checks with their principal
advantage over cash. As a result of this protection, then, it seems that at least
some of the risks associated with forgery and alteration should be assumed by
holders of bank checks.
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tion of these costs that makes bank checks inefficient substi-
tutes for cash.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF CERTAINTY
Bank checks can better serve as viable cash substitutes if
the Code is amended to include provisions assuring them of
that role. These new provisions could be either highly specific
or open-ended and general. The costs that stem from the un-
certainty concomitant with general rules, however, indicate
that more specific provisions would best accommodate and pro-
mote the efficient use of bank checks as cash substitutes.
It is true that nonspecific rules of law are best able to pro-
vide equity in individual cases. They establish a flexible frame-
work for resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis. This
flexibility is important in areas such as tort law. The statutes
and court decisions dealing with torts normally provide only
general guidance for behavior, focusing instead on after-the-
fact resolution of conflicts. This is partly because victim com-
pensation has supplanted behavioral guidance as the primary
goal of tort law.2s Highly specific guidelines would therefore be
superfluous, since the sorts of behavior now regulated by tort
law are seldom the subject of detailed advance planning. In the
area of commercial law, however, the need for unambiguous
behavioral guidelines is much greater.2 6 Businessmen plan
commercial transactions with specificity and care. It is impor-
tant that commercial laws set forth in detail the results certain
to follow from different courses of conduct, so that transac-
tional risks can be avoided or allocated at the planning stage.27
25. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 16-19 (4th
ed. 1971).
26. For a contrary view of the importance of certainty in formulating rules
of commercial law, see Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for
Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907 (1978).
27. It is also important that the drafters of commercial laws consider the
additional costs that are generated when a rule requires one party to assume
certain risks for the protection of another party. The party assuming these
risks usually passes on the cost to the other party. For example, Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code § 2-403 prohibits retailers from taking any negotiable instru-
ment, other than a check, in a consumer credit sale or lease. This prohibition
has been adopted in substance by eight states: Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Oklahoma, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. It protects consumers by ne-
gating the transfer of their notes to a holder in due course, thereby enabling
consumers to raise their defenses no matter who has possession of the note.
The inability of retailers to transfer such notes free of consumer defenses re-
quires the holders to assume the risk of the retailer's breach of contract. Hold-
ers, therefore, will pay retailers less for such notes. This lower price in turn
1980l
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It is also important that commercial laws assure businessmen
that their bargained-for allocations of risk will be respected by
courts.
28
The uncertainty created by open-ended rules of law tilts
the balance in favor of drafting highly specific Code amend-
ments to govern bank checks. Detailed amendments would not
only help businessmen intelligently plan transactions involving
bank checks, but would also decrease the cost of these transac-
tions. The savings, in turn, could be passed on at least in part
to the consuming public. It is conceded that a highly specific
set of rules would deprive courts of the opportunity to settle
disputes on a case-by-case equitable basis. Moreover, the rigid-
ity inherent in a system of specific rules would require that a
certain amount of adaptability be sacrificed. A wisely drafted
system of rules would, however, provide equity in the over-
whelming majority of cases. Furthermore, adaptability is not
necessarily desirable in this context;29 the changing economic
causes retailers to raise the prices of their products so that they will obtain the
same net price. Since this prohibition on taking negotiable instruments other
than checks applies even where sophisticated buyers are involved, all consum-
ers are required to pay for this added protection.
28. Also to be considered are the counterproductive costs generated by the
uncertainty inherent in open-ended commercial laws. The costs of litigation
and planning comprise the major portion of these increased costs. The behav-
ior of finance companies that hold consumer notes illustrates these costs.
U.C.C. § 3-302 provides that unless the holder of a note fails to meet certain re-
quirements, he is a holder in due course and takes free of any claim or defense
of the maker of the note. At least one court has held, however, that a finance
company which has a close connection with the seller of consumer goods might
not be a holder in due course, even if the finance company appears to meet all
of the section 3-302 requirements. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405
(1967). This judicial gloss on section 3-302 makes the rules of law relating to
transactions involving consumer notes and finance companies very uncertain.
Since the issue of holder in due course status, even when meritless, may be
raised by a consumer, finance companies must take the risk of litigation into
consideration when calculating the discount to be exacted from retailers when
purchasing retailers' notes. This additional, unproductive cost is ultimately
passed on to the consumer in the form of higher prices.
An uncertain rule, subject to a variety of plausible interpretations, offers an
obligor some incentive for requiring his obligee to establish and enforce the ob-
ligation in court. Such a rule may offer false color to the obligor's position, and
may be used to circumvent a motion for summary judgment, or to obtain a
favorable settlement even when none is deserved. Businessmen consult attor-
neys at the planning stage of commercial transactions. The more uncertain the
effects of a law are upon a particular transaction, the more time-consuming and
costly will be the attorney's services. These added costs are ultimately passed
on to the consuming public.
29. It has been suggested that the inadaptability of Articles 3 and 4 to elec-
tronic funds transfer systems is a fault of the positivist scheme of those arti-
cles. Jackson & Peters, supra note 26, at 908. This view, however, fails to take
account of the fact that electronic funds transfer systems present such varied
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realities brought about by novel systems of transferring funds
may require totally new rules rather than piecemeal adjust-
ments to existing rules.
This approach to drafting new Code provisions governing
bank checks is consistent with the philosophy underlying Arti-
cles 3 and 4. Like its predecessor, the N.I.L., Article 3 was in-
tended to establish a detailed set of rules defining rights and
liabilities for the various types of negotiable instruments.30 If
the legal consequences of using a certain negotiable instrument
in commercial transactions are not foreseeable, the free negoti-
ability of that instrument will be seriously undermined. The
Code, therefore, should provide clear and certain guidance to
the users of bank checks. Until Articles 3 and 4 are amended,
bank checks will remain inefficient cash substitutes.
III. CASHIER'S CHECKS
A. INTRODUCTION
A cashier's check is a negotiable instrument drawn by a
bank upon itself.31 The issuing bank is both drawer and
drawee, and is primarily liable on the instrument. Occasionally
a bank issues a cashier's check in satisfaction of a debt it owes
to the check's payee. More often, though, a customer of the is-
suing bank purchases a cashier's check for its own use. Two
separate transactions are usually involved in the latter case.
First, the bank in effect sells the check to its customer. Then
the customer, referred to as the purchaser, negotiates the
check to a third party.
Although the common belief is that cashier's checks are
cash equivalents, the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code give no indication of how cashier's checks are to be
treated.3 2 The Code's failure to set forth the rights and liabili-
problems and different needs for allocation of losses that any rule capable of
covering both electronic funds transfer systems and conventional commercial
paper would necessarily be so open-ended that it would be extremely cost-inef-
ficient.
30. See Llewellyn, supra note 6, at 380.
31. Cashier's checks should not be confused with personal money orders.
The two instruments are purchased for different reasons. Courts treat personal
money orders as single-transaction personal checks; the purchaser is the
drawer, and the bank is the drawee. The purchaser normally is a person who
does not have a checking account, but who needs a check for the safe transfer
of funds and for record-keeping purposes. See Note, Personal Money Orders
and Teller's Checks: Mavericks Under the UCC, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 524, 524-39
(1967).
32. There is no explicit reference to cashier's checks in Article 3. The
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ties of the parties to a cashier's check has created a good deal
of confusion. Moreover, the concern voiced by those courts
that seek to ensure the cash-like quality of cashier's checks 33 is
at odds with the assumption that these checks should be gov-
erned by existing provisions of the Code.
The problem of allocating the risks of litigation and of lost
funds has been especially vexing when either the bank or pur-
chaser has a defense arising from the purchase of a cashier's
check or from its subsequent negotiation. Courts and commen-
tators have divided sharply over which parties most deserve
protection. Two general approaches to the problem have devel-
oped. The first looks upon cashier's checks as ordinary negotia-
ble instruments, and treats them as such under the Code.3
The second approach looks upon cashier's checks as cash
equivalents, and ignores the Code provisions that allow obli-
gors on ordinary negotiable instruments to escape liability
under certain conditions.3 5
1. The Ordinary Negotiable Instrument Theory
The majority of commentators and a minority of the
courts 36 have adopted the first approach, viewing the bank's lia-
bility on a cashier's check as governed by Code sections 3-3053 7
Code's only reference to cashier's checks is in section 4-211(1), which enumer-
ates the types of payment that collecting banks may take in settlement of an
instrument for the payment of money.
33. See cases cited in note 155 infra.
34. See notes 36-46 infra and accompanying text.
35. See notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text.
36. Some of the courts taking this position view a cashier's check as a
promissory note, while others view it as an accepted draft. Comment, Commer-
cial Paper: Taking a Bank Money Order "For Value" Under U.C.C. Section 3-
303, 63 MN. L. REV. 983, 985-86 n.12 (1979). Under either approach, however,
courts apply U.C.C. §§ 3-305 and 3-306 to determine the liability of banks. Most
courts follow the pre-Code view that cashier's checks are bank drafts accepted
by the act of issuance. See, e.g., Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 538
F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1976); Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d
620 (7th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.
1970); Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 14 Ill. App. 3d 729, 303 N.E.2d 186
(1973). See also Fox, supra note 23, at 690 n.55; Wallach, supra note 23, at 587
n.36; Note, supra note 5, at 427 n.25. A minority of courts, however, have
adopted the view that cashier's checks should be treated as promissory notes.
See, e.g., TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1973); Banco Ganadero y Agric-
ola v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Laurel Bank &
Trust Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d 1222 (Super. Ct. 1976);
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41 (Del. 1970); State
Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 266 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 1978); Thompson Poultry,
Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 255 N.W.2d 856 (1977). See generally 6D W.
WILLER & F. HART, supra note 23, § 4-403, at 2-1194.
37. U.C.C. § 3-305 provides:
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and 3-306.38 These are the provisions applicable to obligors on
notes and ordinary personal checks. Although in agreement on
the particular Code provisions that determine liability, the pro-
ponents of this view are nevertheless split over the precise na-
ture of cashier's checks. One group considers the instrument
similar to a promissory note,39 viewing the bank as the note's
maker. This group draws support from section 3-118(a), 40
which provides that a draft drawn on a drawer is to be treated
as a note. The other group considers a cashier's check similar
to a draft of the issuing bank that the bank has accepted by the
act of issuance.41 Despite this conspicuous difference, the sec-
ond group believes that the practical import of characterizing
cashier's checks as accepted drafts rather than as notes is in-
significant, because section 3-413(1) provides that the contracts
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the
instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the
holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple
contract, and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the
transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity;
and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportu-
nity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential
terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he
takes the instrument.
38. U.C.C. § 3-306 provides:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes
the instrument subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an ac-
tion on a simple contract; and
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-perform-
ance of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for
a special purpose (Section 3-408); and
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the
instrument acquired it by theft, or that payment or satisfac-
tion to such holder would be inconsistent with the terms of a
restrictive indorsement. The claim of any third person to the
instrument is not otherwise available as a defense to any
party liable thereon unless the third person himself defends
the action for such party.
39. See note 36 supra.
40. U.C.C. § 3-118 provides, in part, that "[t]he following rules apply to
every instrument. (a) Where there is doubt whether the instrument is a draft
or a note the holder may treat it as either. A draft drawn on the drawer is effec-
tive as a note."
41. See note 36 supra.
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of acceptors and of makers are identical.42 Assuming therefore
that the contract of an issuing bank is the same under either of
these views, the second group concludes that a bank's liability
on cashier's checks should be governed by sections 3-305 and 3-
306, just as if the check were a note.
Although seductive, the reasoning of both groups is flawed.
Section 3-118(a) was intended simply to eliminate the need for
a holder of a note or accepted draft to protest or give notice of
dishonor to the instrument's maker or acceptor.43 The drafts-
men of the Code recognized that requiring these parties to pro-
test or give notice of dishonor would serve no function, since
presumably they should already be aware of their own refusal
to pay. Section 3-413(1) was designed to deal with the effect of
alteration, and to set out the procedural conditions precedent
to the liability of the instrument's acceptor or maker.44 Neither
sections 3-118(a) nor 3-413(1) were drafted with the aim of
specifying the defenses available to obligors. In fact, under the
Code, it is clear that acceptors and makers have different obli-
gations. Sections 3-305 and 3-306 govern the liability of a maker
of a note, while section 3-41845 expressly controls the liability of
an acceptor of a draft.4 Nearly all courts and commentators,
however, have overlooked this distinction.
42. U.C.C. § 3-413(1) provides: "Te maker or acceptor engages that he will
pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his engagement or as
completed pursuant to Section 3-115 on incomplete instruments."
43. U.C.C. § 3-118(a), which essentially adopts the position taken by N.LL.
§ 130, was intended to give the holder of a cashier's check, or of any other draft
drawn on the drawer, the procedural advantages that accrue to the holder of a
promissory note. These advantages include eliminating the need that the
holder present the instrument for payment or give notice of dishonor as a con-
dition precedent to the liability of the draft's drawer. See W. BnrrroN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLs AND NoTEs § 187, at 528 (2d ed. 1961); id. § 221, at
576.
44. At common law, an acceptor engaged to pay the instrument according
to its original tenor. Because of the ambiguous language of N.LL. § 62, a split
later developed among the courts on this point, with some holding instead that
the acceptor engaged to pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of
the acceptance. See W. BnrrrON, supra note 43, § 140, at 399. See also U.C.C.
§ 3-413, Official Comment.
45. U.C.C. § 3418 provides:
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the Article on
Bank Deposits and Collections (Article 4) and except for liability for
breach of warranty on presentment under the preceding section, pay-
ment or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a holder in
due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his position in
reliance on the payment.
46. See U.C.C. § 3413, Official Comment.
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2. The Cash-Substitute Theory
The majority of courts passing on the question of a bank's
liability on its own cashier's checks have adopted the second
approach, treating cashier's checks as almost equivalent to
cash.47 Most of these courts have taken the position that a
cashier's check is an accepted draft, but have ignored sections
3-305, 3-306, and 3-418 in determining the liability of the issuing
bank. Instead, they have imposed an absolute obligation on the
issuing banks, prohibiting them from raising any defenses to
payment, even against holders who are not holders in due
course. In National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano,4 the
court explained the reason for subordinating the interests of
the bank and the check's purchaser to the holder's expectation
that he has received a true cash equivalent:
A cashier's check circulates in the commercial world as the
equivalent of cash .... People accept a cashier's check as a substi-
tute for cash because the bank stands behind it, rather than an individ-
ual. In effect the bank becomes a guarantor of the value of the check
and pledges its resources to the payment of the amount represented
upon presentation. To allow the bank to stop payment on such an in-
strument would be inconsistent with the representation it makes in is-
suing the check. Such a rule would undermine the public confidence in
the bank and its checks and thereby deprive the cashier's check of the
essential incident which makes it useful. People would no longer be
willing to accept it as a substitute for cash if they could not be sure
that there would be no difficulty in converting it into cash.4 9
One problem with the approach taken in National Newark is
that no Code provisions support it. As a result, courts following
National Newark have often relied upon inapplicable Code
provisions which only superficially support their judgments re-
garding the cash-like nature of cashier's checks.50
47. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 552 F.2d 1072, 1078 (4th Cir. 1977); Swiss Credit
Bank v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 587, 588 (4th Cir. 1976); Munson v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 1973); Kaufman v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); State ex rel Chan Siew
Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1976); National Newark & Essex Bank v.
Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 350, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (1970); Tranarg v. Banca
Commerciale Italiana, 90 Misc. 2d 829, 835-36, 396 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (Sup. Ct.
1977); Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918,
920, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976); Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank
& Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1973).
48. 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970).
49. Id. at 351-52, 268 A.2d at 329.
50. Since a stop payment order may not be issued against an accepted in-
strument, see U.C.C. § 4-303(1) (a), several courts have prohibited banks from
raising any defense against cashier's checks. See Munson v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); State ex reL. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell,
536 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1976); National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J.
Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970); Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust, 495
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Neither of these approaches-the ordinary negotiable in-
struments theory or the cash-substitute theory-is satisfactory.
Cashier's checks deserve special treatment because of their
distinctive role as a cash substitute, and the courts that treat
cashier's checks under the provisions of the Code governing or-
dinary checks and notes fail to accommodate this unique role.
On the other hand, the courts that accord cashier's checks
cash-equivalent status by misapplying the Code diminish the
Code's utility as a guide for commercial planning. The situa-
tion can be corrected only by amending the Code to specifically
define the nature of liability on cashier's checks.
B. THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF CASHIER'S CHECKS
Before discussing the Code amendments needed to pro-
mote a more cost-efficient role for cashier's checks, it would be
helpful to examine more fully the current rights and liabilities
of parties to cashier's checks. This examination will focus on
the rules governing the claims and defenses that may be raised
by banks which are resisting payment, because it is these rules
that provide the greatest potential for diluting the role of cash-
ier's checks as cash substitutes.
1. The Appropriate Terminology
When some irregularity surrounding the issuance or nego-
tiation of a cashier's check has occurred, the purchaser or the
issuing bank itself may desire that payment be resisted. These
situations often raise the issue of whether a purchaser or a
bank may have payment stopped. The term "stop payment,"
however, has no application either to a bank's right to refuse
payment or to a purchaser's ability to compel a bank to refuse
payment.5 ' The use of this term only confuses the real issue:
whether a bank's obligation to pay a cashier's check may be
nullified by the interposition of either the purchaser's or the
bank's own claims or defenses.
The purchaser of a cashier's check has no right to order the
bank to stop payment on the check.52 This is clear from section
S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1973). One court, however, relied upon U.C.C. § 3-802. See
Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 386
N.Y.S.2d 974 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976); text accompanying notes 161-164 infra.
51. See Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 575
(Tex. 1973) (Walker, J., dissenting).
52. Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1970); Na-
tional Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327
(1970); Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 58 A.D.2d 103, 106, 396 N.Y.S.2d 414,
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4-403(1),53 which permits a person to stop payment only on an
instrument "payable for his account. '5 4 Whether considered a
note or an accepted draft, a cashier's check is payable for the
account of the issuing bank, not the check's purchaser. An al-
ternative analysis, which applies only if a cashier's check is
considered an accepted draft, leads to the same conclusion
based on section 4-303(1) (a). 55 This section provides that a
stop payment order on a negotiable instrument comes too late
if given subsequent to acceptance.
A purchaser may attempt to accomplish a result similar to
stopping payment by asserting an adverse claim to a cashier's
check5 6 The right of a purchaser to assert such a claim, how-
ever, appears doubtful.5 7 Moreover, the procedural limitations
415-16 (1977), affid, 44 N.Y.2d 776, 377 N.E.2d 474, 406 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1978). Prior to
enactment of the U.C.C., some courts did permit a purchaser to stop payment
on a cashier's check. See Nielsen v. Planters Trust & Say. Bank, 183 La. 645, 647,
164 So. 613, 615-16 (1935); Wolf v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 251 A.D. 354, 356, 296
N.Y.S. 800, 802-03 (1937), affid, 277 N.Y. 626, 14 N.E.2d 193 (1938); Drinkall v.
Movius State Bank, 11 ND. 10, 12, 88 N.W. 724, 726 (1901); Preston v. First State
Bank, 344 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
53. U.C.C. § 4-403(1) provides:
A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item paya-
ble for his account but the order must be received at such time and in
such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it
prior to any action by the bank with respect to the item described in
Section 4-303.
54. The rationale for this limitation is expressed in U.C.C. § 4-403, Official
Comment 5:
There is no right to stop payment after certification of a check or other
acceptance of a draft, and this is true no matter who procures the certi-
fication. See Sections 3-411 and 4-303. The acceptance is the drawee's
own engagement to pay, and he is not required to impair his credit by
refusing payment for the convenience of the drawer.
55. U.C.C. § 4-303(1) provides, in part:
Any knowledge, notice or stop-order received by, legal process served
upon or setoff exercised by a payor bank, whether or not effective
under other rules of law to terminate, suspend or modify the bank's
right or duty to pay an item or to charge its customer's account for the
item, comes too late to so terminate, suspend or modify such right or
duty if the knowledge, notice, stop-order or legal process is received or
served and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon expires or the
setoff is exercised after the bank has done any of the following-
(a) accepted or certified the item ....
56. The right to assert an adverse claim is governed by U.C.C. § 3-603(1)
which provides, in part:
The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment or
satisfaction to the holder even though it is made with knowledge of a
claim of another person to the instrument unless prior to such pay-
ment or satisfaction the person making the claim either supplies in-
demnity deemed adequate by the party seeking the discharge or
enjoins payment or satisfaction by order of a court of competent juris-
diction in an action in which the adverse claimant and the holder are
parties.
57. See notes 154-169 infra and accompanying text.
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on asserting adverse claims make this approach far less effec-
tive than the analogous right of a drawer to stop payment on
his personal checks.5 8 In rare instances, a purchaser may per-
suade the issuing bank to refuse payment on a cashier's check,
or the bank may refuse payment out of its own self-interest
when it has a defense arising out of the issuance of the check.
The term stopping payment is equally inappropriate for
describing these situations.59
2. The Bank's Ability to Raise Its Own Defenses
When a bank has issued a cashier's check by mistake, or
the consideration given for the check has failed,60 the bank may
refuse payment on the check. This forces the holder to bring a
lawsuit establishing his right to payment. Whether a bank pur-
sues this option depends on the bank's ability under the Code
to advance its own defenses against the check.
In considering the circumstances under which a bank can
defend against an action for payment on a cashier's check, it is
important first to determine whether the holder of the check
has dealt with the bank. When the purchaser of the check re-
tains it, the bank, of course, has dealt with the holder. This sit-
uation significantly increases a bank's ability to successfully
resist payment. Because of the liberal joinder of claims rules
58. In order to assert an adverse claim, the claimant must either supply in-
demnity for the obligor or obtain an injunction by a court having jurisdiction
over both the obligor and holder. U.C.C. § 3-603(1). Issuance of a stop payment
order, however, merely requires that the customer give notice to his bank "at
such time and in such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to
act on it prior to any action by the bank with respect to the item described in
Section 4-303." U.C.C. § 4-403(1).
59. The concept of stopping payment has relevance only to relations be-
tween a bank and its customer, the check's drawer. Since a personal check is
simply an order to pay, a customer has the right to revoke the order before it is
carried out. See Hawkland, Stop Payment Orders Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 75 COM. LJ. 53 (1970). Since the bank, as both drawer and drawee, is
its own customer when it issues a cashier's check, it is nonsensical to speak of
the bank's liability to itself for failing to stop payment on a cashier's check. Al-
though it is obvious that the bank has the power to refuse to pay the check
upon presentment, the real question is whether the bank has any legal basis
for defeating the holder's subsequent action for payment.
60. In the following cases the issuing bank took a personal check drawn on
insufficient funds in return for its cashier's check. Banco Ganadero y Agricola
v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Kaufman v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v.
City Nat'l Bank, 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d 1222 (Super. Ct 1976). There also
are cases where a bank took a forged check in payment for its cashier's check.
E.g., Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973)
(forged certification); Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 14 Ill. App. 3d 729,
303 N.E.2d 186 (1973).
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followed in most jurisdictions, a bank that has grounds for a de-
fense arising out of the transaction in which the holder
purchased the check may raise these grounds in the form of a
counterclaim against the holder, regardless of whether the
Code recognizes the grounds as a valid defense to a bank's obli-
gation.61 For example, if a holder purchased a cashier's check
with a personal check drawn on insufficient funds, the bank
could raise the holder's liability on his personal check as a
counterclaim in the holder's action for payment on the cash-
ier's check.
Typically, though, the purchaser of a cashier's check ac-
quires the instrument from a bank for the purpose of negotiat-
ing it to a third party. In these cases, the issuing bank will not
have dealt with the check's ultimate holder. Although the bank
may have a complaint stemming from its issuance of the cash-
ier's check to the purchaser, the bank is unable to raise this
complaint as a counterclaim. The bank's ability to defeat the
holder's action, therefore, depends upon whether the Code per-
mits obligors to assert complaints, such as failure of the pur-
chaser's consideration, as defenses to their obligations on
cashier's checks.
The Code apparently recognizes this procedural distinction
in the provisions that relate to ordinary personal checks and
drafts-sections 3-305 and 3-306--which permit the assertion of
defenses only against holders in due course with whom the ob-
ligor has dealt62 and holders who are not holders in due
course.63 Section 3-306, however, which permits obligors to as-
sert defenses against certain holders with whom the obligor
has not dealt, evinces a value judgment that in certain situa-
tions society's interest in negotiability should give way to the
interests of the obligor. It is not clear that the draftsmen of the
Code ever contemplated the application of these provisions to
cashier's checks, since these provisions certainly weaken the
role of cashier's checks as cash substitutes. It is perhaps for
this reason that many courts dealing with cashier's checks have
ignored these provisions and found support for their positions
elsewhere.64 Because there are significant differences between
61. In most jurisdictions, a defendant may assert any claim he has against
the plaintiff as a permissive counterclaim. See, e.g., FED. . CMy. P. 13; CAT. CIV.
PRoc. CODE § 428.10 (West 1973); ILT. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 38(1) (Smith-Hurd
1976); Mu. M. Civ. P. 13.02.
62. U.C.C. § 3-305(2).
63. Id. § 3-306(b), (c).
64. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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a bank's ability to defend against its obligation on its cashier's
checks when it has dealt with the holder and when it has not,
the two situations are considered separately.
a. Defenses Available When the Bank Has Dealt with the
Holder
A person who has purchased a cashier's check will not nec-
essarily negotiate it to a third party. He may instead present it,
through his own depositary bank, to the issuing bank for pay-
ment. The purchaser may have obtained a cashier's check in
lieu of cash as final payment for a personal check drawn on the
issuing bank. Or, he may have taken the check in payment for
services rendered or goods furnished to the bank. Finally, a
purchaser may have intended to use a cashier's check in a busi-
ness transaction, but prior to negotiating it, may have become
aware that the bank would raise defenses against it.
When such a purchaser sues to compel payment of a cash-
ier's check, the bank is permitted to raise any defense or coun-
terclaim it has against the purchaser.65 This ability derives
simply from a desire to effect the resolution of all disputes be-
tween the parties in a single action, that is, to avoid a multiplic-
ity of suits. Courts and commentators have used conflicting
rationales to justify this result. The apparent majority of com-
mentators, discussing the question of when a bank may raise
its own defenses against the holder of a cashier's check with
whom the bank has dealt, have looked to sections 3-305 and 3-
30666 because no other provisions of the Code seem to govern
an obligor's ability to raise its own defenses. These sections
permit an obligor on an ordinary negotiable instrument to as-
sert any defense against a holder with whom it has dealt, even
when the holder has the status of a holder in due course.
Two courts have applied this analysis.67 Wilmington Trust
Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales68 involved a situation in which a
person had purchased a car with a personal check and then or-
65. See U.C.C. § 3-305(2); note 61 supra.
66. See 6D W. WIIaER & F. HART, supra note 23, § 4-403, at 2-1194. Benson,
supra note 23, at 450; Wallach, supra note 23, at 590-91; Note, Adverse Claims
and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protection Available, supra note 23, at
919-20.
67. TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1973); Wilmington Trust Co. v.
Delaware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41 (Del. 1970). Pre-U.C.C. cases that have ap-
plied analogous rules include Citizens Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 334
F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964) and Tropicana Pools, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 206 So.2d
48 (Fla. 1968).
68. 271 A.2d 41 (DeL 1970).
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dered payment stopped on the check. The bank mistakenly
failed to comply with the stop payment order and paid the auto
dealer by issuing a cashier's check. After discovering its error,
the bank refused to honor the cashier's check. The court held
that, under section 3-305(2), the bank could raise the defense of
failure of consideration against the check's holder, since the
bank had dealt with the holder.6 9 In the case of TPO Inc. v.
FDIC,7 0 the court held that the payee of a cashier's check, who
had assisted in fraudulently inducing the bank to issue the
check, was subject to the bank's defense of fraud under sec-
tions 3-306(b) and (c)Y 1
The Wilmington Trust and TPO cases were decided by
courts that treat cashier's checks as promissory notes. Most
courts, however, view cashier's checks not as promissory notes,
but as accepted drafts.7 2 Under this view, section 3-418 governs
the bank's ability to raise its own defenses against its obliga-
tion to pay.73 The dissent in Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank
& Trust,74 a case which also involved a bank mistakenly issuing
a cashier's check as payment to the holder of a personal check
69. Id. at 42. One problem with the court's analysis is its finding that there
was a failure of consideration for the cashier's check. The court reasoned that
consideration had failed since the bank was unable to debit its customer's ac-
count after the bank had mistakenly violated his stop payment order. The
court failed to consider that under U.C.C. § 3-418 the bank's payment of a per-
sonal check over a timely stop payment order constitutes final payment as to
the holder. Since the holder in Wilmington Trust was entitled to the funds mis-
takenly paid to him by the bank, he gave the bank sufficient consideration for
the cashier's check by relinquishing this claim. See Banco Ganadero y Agricola
v. Society Nat'1 Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520, 524, 526 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank v. Youngblood, 135 Ga. App. 638, 640, 219 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1975). The
Wilmington Trust court should have found that there was adequate considera-
tion for the cashier's check, and then permitted the bank to raise as a counter-
claim the customer's cause of action against the holder to which the bank was
subrogated. See U.C.C. § 4-407(c) (permitting bank that has paid over timely
stop payment order to be subrogated to rights of the drawer as against the
holder).
70. 487 F.2d 131 (3d Cir; 1973).
71. Id. at 136. The rationale of TPO was followed in the recent case of
State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 266 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 1978). State Bank,
however, did not involve a situation where the holder had dealt with the bank.
72. See notes 36 supra; text accompanying note 47 supra.
73. A certified check is a draft that has been accepted by the drawee bank,
and the right of a bank to rescind its certification is governed by U.C.C. § 3-418.
See Admiral Leather Corp. v. Manchester Modes, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Rockland Trust Co. v. South Shore Nat'l Bank, 366 Mass. 74, 314
N.E.2d 438 (1974); Balducci v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 74 Misc. 2d 406, 345
N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1972), affd, 41 A.D.2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1973). Thus,
if a cashier's check is regarded as an accepted draft, it follows that it also
should be governed by section 3-418.
74. 495 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1973).
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upon which payment had been stopped, adopted this view. The
majority in Wertz had refused to permit the bank to assert the
defense of failure of consideration, reasoning simply that a
bank cannot stop payment on its own cashier's check.75 The
dissent correctly pointed out that the issue did not turn on the
bank's ability to stop payment, but on its capacity to raise fail-
ure of consideration as a defense. The dissent argued that
under the Code, acceptance of a draft should be treated just
like its analogue: final payment. It therefore concluded that
the bank should be capable of refusing to pay a cashier's check
under circumstances in which it could have recovered monies
paid by mistake had the draft been finally paid rather than ac-
cepted.76
Under section 3-418, a bank may resist payment of an ac-
cepted instrument unless the holder is a holder in due course,
or has in good faith and in reliance on payment changed his po-
sition. Despite its dissimilarity, however, section 3-418 does not
lead to a result different from sections 3-305 and 3-306 in situa-
tions where the holder has dealt with the bank. Under section
3-418, even if acceptance is final, the bank can raise its com-
plaint against a holder with whom it has dealt as a counter-
claim rather than as a defense.77
A number of courts steadfastly adhere to the concept that
cashier's checks are cash substitutes, 78 and have flatly refused
to allow an issuing bank to raise even those defenses arising
from transactions with the check's holder.79 These courts have
also recognized, however, that when a bank has dealt with the
holder, the bank may achieve the same result by filing a coun-
terclaim under the local rules of civil procedure.8 0 For instance,
75. Id. at 574.
76. Id. at 576 (Walker, J., dissenting).
77. The bank in Wertz was subrogated to the rights of the drawer of the
personal check upon which payment had been stopped. If there had been a le-
gitimate claim against the holder of the cashier's check, the bank could have
asserted it as a counterclaim in the holder's action for payment. See U.C.C. § 4-
407.
78. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 552 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1977); Swiss Credit Bank
v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1976); Munson v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank &
Trust, 95 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1973).
79. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 552 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1977); Munson v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973); Wertz v. Richardson
Heights Bank & Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1973).
80. See In re Johnson, 522 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1977); Munson v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973).
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in Munson v. American National Bank-& Trust Co.,81 a bank is-
sued a cashier's check in exchange for another bank's certified
check. The certification was a forgery, and the check was sub-
sequently dishonored by the drawee bank. The bank that had
issued the cashier's check raised this failure of consideration as
a defense to its obligation on the cashier's check. The Munson
court, expressly disapproving the Wilmington reasoning,82 held
that the issuing bank was absolutely foreclosed from raising
any defense against the cashier's check.83 The Munson court
did, however, permit the bank to assert as a counterclaim the
holder's breach of warranty on the certified check.84
If cashier's checks are to serve as cash substitutes,85 it is
essential that banks be denied the ability to raise defenses
against holders with whom they have dealt. By demanding a
cashier's check, the holder has bargained to shift to the issuing
bank the risk of litigation and the accompanying loss of the use
of funds. Allowing a bank to raise defenses in an action for
payment on a cashier's check nullifies this bargained-for shift-
ing of risks. If the bank had paid the holder in cash, or if the
holder had already cashed the cashier's check, the bank would
have the burden of commencing legal proceedings to resolve
any problem and the holder would retain the use of his funds
during the pendency of the suit. Ideally, a bank should be com-
pelled to pay the holder of a cashier's check upon presentment,
and then sue the holder in a separate action. The injustice that
may result by requiring a bank to pay the check, although it
may have grounds for complaint against the holder, is a risk
that banks must assume when they issue cashier's checks.
Similarly, banks should not be permitted to escape pay-
81. 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973).
82. Id. at 624 n.8.
83. Id. at 624.
84. Id. The court characterized the counterclaims as offsetting defenses.
85. Concededly, there are times when banks issue cashier's checks that
their holders will not consider cash equivalents. This may occur when a bank
uses a cashier's check to pay for goods or services furnished by the holder. The
holder would not expect to recover on the check if the bank had a defense aris-
ing from the holder's failure to perform properly. It would be virtually impossi-
ble, however, to apply separate rules depending on whether or not the
purchasers expectedto receive a cash substitute. Some courts have taken the
situation where a bank has dealt with a holder to indicate that the cashier's
check was not intended to serve as a cash substitute. See cases cited in note 67
supra. This perception, however, is clearly incorrect. Often, the holder of a
personal check who presents it for final payment prefers to take a cashier's
check instead of cash to alleviate the risk of loss. If these holders were aware
that the bank could assert a defense to its obligation on the cashier's check,
they would certainly have required payment in cash.
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ment on their cashier's checks simply by counterclaiming
against the holder. Unfortunately, most jurisdictions have not
established procedures requiring issuing banks to pay the hold-
ers of cashier's checks prior to adjudication of the bank's coun-
terclaims.8 6 One state, New York, has recognized the need to
provide swift determination of the obligor's liability on negotia-
ble instruments, and permits a holder to file a motion for sum-
mary judgment in lieu of filing a complaint.8 7 In the summary
judgment proceeding, the obligor may raise defenses to his ob-
ligation to pay, but not unrelated counterclaims. In other juris-
dictions, however, the ordinarily liberal rules of joinder have
not been modified to accommodate the peculiar sets of inter-
ests involved in negotiable instruments transactions. This
weakness is especially apparent with respect to cashier's
checks, where the policy of promoting judicial economy that
underlies the rules of joinder works to erode the primary func-
tion of these instruments by making them less freely converti-
ble into cash. Until this inadequacy of the Code is corrected,
86. Since most jurisdictions have no special procedural rules governing ac-
tions on negotiable instruments, the ordinary rules regarding permissive coun-
terclaims are applied. Thus, if a bank's counterclaim is found to raise a
genuine issue of fact, courts will protect the bank just as they would any other
defendant, either by denying the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment or by
granting the motion but staying execution pending the outcome of the counter-
claim. See Taylor v. Rederi A/S Volo, 374 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1967); Luders v.
Pummer, 152 Cal. App. 2d 276, 313 P.2d 38 (1957); Farm Serv. Co. v. Askeland,
169 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1969); Chelsea Exch. Bank v. Munoz, 202 A.D. 702, 195
N.Y.S. 484 (1922); Reiniger Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 25
Ohio App. 2d 25, 266 N.E.2d 257 (1970).
87. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 3213 (McKinney 1970) provides that instead of
commencing an action by the usual method of summons and complaint, a
plaintiff may accompany the summons with motion papers for summary judg-
ment. The summons requires the defendant to serve opposing papers, and to
appear for the motion on a date specified in the motion papers. If the motion is
denied, the moving and answering papers serve as the complaint and answer,
respectively, unless the court orders otherwise. The purpose of the section is
to afford quick resolution of actions on negotiable instruments, since these ac-
tions carry a strong presumption of merit and should not be subject to the
same cumbersome treatment as other actions. In the absence of exceptional
circumstances, therefore, it would be inconsistent with this purpose to permit a
plaintiff's claim to be held up by the litigation of unrelated counterclaims. Nor-
mally, the court will sever an unrelated counterclaim and order a separate trial.
See Mike Nasti Sand Co. v. Almar Landscaping Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 550, 293
N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 34 A.D.2d 554, 309 N.Y.S.2d
697 (1970); Wildeb Rest., Inc. v. Jolin Restaurant, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 1012, 331
N.Y.S.2d 575 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972). See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 3213 (McKinney
1970) (Practice Commentaries C 3213:17). It is not clear whether a counterclaim
against a cashier's check holder based, for instance, on the bank's right of sub-
rogation under U.C.C. § 4-407, is an unrelated counterclaim. If the New York
procedure is to enhance the cash equivalency of cashier's checks, such counter-
claims must be considered unrelated.
[Vol. 64.275
BANK CHECKS
banks may continue to cause unnecessary transactional ineffi-
ciency by raising defenses to their obligations on cashier's
checks under the terminology of counterclaim.
b. Defenses Available When the Bank Has Not Dealt with
the Holder
When the purchaser of a cashier's check has transferred
the check to a third party, the bank can no longer resist pay-
ment by raising counterclaims that stem from the issuance of
the check.88 This is because the third-party holder cannot be
made liable for the debts of the purchaser. The only question
in this situation, then, is whether the bank may raise its com-
plaints against the purchaser as defenses in an action for pay-
ment by the holder of the check. Courts generally have
allowed banks faced with this problem to litigate their own de-
fenses to payment.89 Relatively few of the courts deciding this
issue, however, have taken account of the peculiar set of inter-
ests inhering in the use of cashier's checks.90 Several courts
have ignored these interests entirely, and have simply resolved
the dispute as if it concerned a conflict between a holder of and
an obligor on an ordinary note or personal check.91
There is a substantial body of authority which takes the po-
sition that sections 3-305 and 3-306 govern the ability of a bank
to raise its own defenses when a third-party holder is in-
volved.92 Under this theory, the bank's ability to successfully
resist payment by asserting its own defenses depends solely
88. Of course, if the transfer of the check from the purchaser to the holder
involved a fraud upon the bank, the holder would be liable to the bank, under
the laws of fraudulent conveyance, for the amount of the check. If the pur-
chaser transfers the check to the holder for inadequate consideration while the
purchaser is insolvent or knows that he soon will be insolvent, or with actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, the bank, as a creditor, may set
aside the conveyance. See Uwr oRm FRAuDnuLr CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4, 6, 7, 9,
10. Similar rules exist in states that have not adopted the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act. See generally 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances §§ 5-6
(1968).
89. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1970);
Banco Ganadero y Agricola v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. Ohio
1976); Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d
1222 (Super. Ct. 1976); Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 14 Ill. App. 3d 729,
303 N.E.2d 186 (1973); State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 266 N.W.2d 496
(Minn. 1978).
90. See Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 587 (4th Cir.
1976); Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973);
Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
91. See cases cited in note 89 supra.
92. See cases cited in note 89 supra; 6D W. WnunR & F. HART, supra note
23, § 4-403, at 2-1194; Benson, supra note 23, at 450; Wallach, supra note 23, at
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upon whether the third party demanding payment is a holder
in due course.93
In Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City National Bank,94 the
purchaser gave the bank one of its own personal checks as con-
sideration for a cashier's check. It then transferred the cash-
ier's check in payment of an antecedent debt. The purchaser's
personal check was subsequently dishonored for insufficient
funds. The court determined that the transferee of the cash-
ier's check was a holder in due course, 95 and therefore held
that section 3-305(2) precluded the bank from raising the de-
fense of failure of consideration. 96 In dictum, the court noted
that, under section 3-306(b), the bank could raise the defense of
failure of consideration against a person not having the rights
of a holder in due course.97 Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Cur-
tiss National Bank,98 the court observed that had it not found
adequate consideration for the cashier check in question, it
would have allowed the bank to raise the defense of failure of
consideration against a party not having the rights of a holder
in due course.99
Applying sections 3-305 and 3-306 to such cases requires
resolution of the difficult question of who can qualify as a
holder in due course of a cashier's check. Under the literal
terms of the Code, a holder who has taken for value and in
good faith is denied holder in due course status only when he
has notice of a claim to or defense against the instrument it-
self. 0 0 There is pre-Code authority, however, supporting the
proposition that notice of a purchaser's defense against the
holder arising from the underlying transaction, although cer-
tainly not available to the bank as a defense, deprives the
holder of holder in due course status.' 0 ' Thus, notice of the de-
590-91; Note, Adverse Claims and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protection
Available?, supra note 23, at 919-20.
93. Since the bank has not dealt with the holder, it is foreclosed by U.C.C.
§ 3-305(2) from raising any defense other than real defenses (infancy, incapac-
ity, duress, etc.) against a holder in due course. But under U.C.C. § 3-306(b)
and (c), regardless of whether the bank has dealt with the holder, the bank can
raise any of its defenses if the holder is not a holder in due course.
94. 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d 1222 (Super. Ct. 1976).
95. Id. at 646, 365 A.2d at 1225.
96. Id. at 647, 365 A.2d at 1226.
97. Id. at 643, 365 A.2d at 1225.
98. 427 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1970).
99. Id. at 399.
100. U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (c).
101. There appear to be no cases arising under the U.C.C. deciding the issue
of whether a holder who has notice of the purchaser's defenses on the underly-
ing transaction is denied the status of a holder in due course. There are pre-
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fective nature of an automobile might deprive the automobile
dealer of holder in due course status if he accepts payment by
cashier's check. This is true even though the bank could not
raise a breach of warranty defense against the dealer in an ac-
tion for payment.10 2 If the dealer loses its holder in due course
status, it then becomes subject to the bank's defense of failure
of consideration. 0 3 Consequently, the holders of cashier's
checks who do not qualify as holders in due course may also
include certain persons who have had no notice of the bank's
own defenses to the instrument and who gave value to the pur-
chaser in exchange for the cashier's check.
It could also be argued that section 3-418 should determine
when a bank may raise its own defenses against a holder with
whom it has not dealt. Since section 3-418 controls this issue
with respect to certified checks,' ° 4 it seems logical that the
courts which treat cashier's checks as accepted drafts should
apply this section.10 5 No court, as of yet, has so held. Under
section 3-418, regardless of whether the bank has dealt with the
holder, the bank is foreclosed from raising any defense on the
holder's action if the holder is a holder in due course or has
changed position in good faith reliance on the acceptance. In
the context of cashier's checks, this rule raises the difficult in-
terpretive problem of determining whether a holder qualifies as
a holder in due course'0 6 or whether a holder has changed posi-
tion in good faith.10 7
U.C.C. cases on the analogous issue of whether a holder with notice of the
payee's defenses is a holder in due course with respect to the maker. The gen-
eral rule was that such knowledge did not preclude holder in due course status
with respect to the obligor's defenses. See Baird v. Lorenz, 57 N.D. 804, 808, 224
N.W. 206, 208 (1929); Long v. City Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 256 S.W. 1006, 1010
(Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Crawford, 69 W. Va. 109, 116, 70
S.E. 1089, 1091 (1911); W. BnrrroN, supra note 43, § 117, at 296. However, there
are cases to the contrary. See Walker v. Bartlesville State Bank, 91 Okla. 231,
232, 216 P. 928, 929 (1923); Fehr v. Campbell, 288 Pa. 549, 560, 137 A. 113, 117
(1927).
102. See U.C.C. § 3-306(d). Since breach of warranty is a mere defense and
not a claim of ownership, an issuing bank may not raise the purchaser's breach
of warranty defense even against one who is not a holder in due course.
103. Id. § 3-306(b), (c).
104. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
105. See Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 575-76
(Tex. 1973) (Walker, J., dissenting); text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
106. See note 101 supra and accompanying text
107. Since acceptance is final not only as to holders in due course but also
as to persons who have in good faith changed position in reliance on the ac-
ceptance, see notes 211-214 infra and accompanying text, the bank is foreclosed
from raising any defenses against the holder if he so qualifies. The first prob-
lem in applying this standard is determining whether a holder who has notice
of one of the purchaser's defenses, but not of the bank's defenses, can be said
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The strict application of either sections 3-305 and 3-306, or
section 3-418 to situations in which the issuing bank has not
dealt with the holder would create certain anomalies. Consider
again the example of a car dealer who sells a car with knowl-
edge that it is defective. If the dealer receives payment by
check, he probably would not enjoy the status of a holder in
due course.1 08 If the check were a personal check, the seller
would be entitled to recover the full purchase price less the
buyer's damages. But if the seller, in order to assure himself of
payment, had required payment by cashier's check, it is con-
ceivable that he might not be able to recover anything against
either the buyer or the bank. This anomalous result could oc-
cur if the buyer of the car obtained the cashier's check by giv-
ing the bank a forged payroll check, or in some other way failed
to give value for the check. Under sections 3-306 or 3-418, the
bank could raise this failure of consideration as a total defense
to an action for payment by the car dealer. Thus, even though
the buyer of the car would have a claim only for his loss due to
the defect, the bank would have a defense to the entire face
to have changed position in good faith when he releases the goods to the pur-
chaser upon receipt of the check. In other words, has the holder exhibited the
necessary "honesty in fact," see U.C.C. § 1-201(19), that is required for good
faith? The second problem is determining what constitutes a change of posi-
tion in reliance on the acceptance of the check. Although it is clear that the
relinquishment of goods or the rendition of services in return for a check con-
stitutes a sufficient change of position, it is not clear whether accepting the
check in payment of an antecedent debt would be sufficient, even though the
holder might have refrained from commencing suit on the debt in reliance on
the check. Similarly, it is not clear whether the fact that under U.C.C. § 3-
802(1) the holder has lost his cause of action against the purchaser on the un-
derlying transaction constitutes a change of position. Although there are no
post-U.C.C. cases on point, certain pre-U.C.C. cases, which consider the same
question with reference to check certification procured by the holder, have held
that the discharge of the drawer is a sufficient change of position. See Times
Square Auto. Co. v. Rutherford Nat'l Bank, 77 N.J.L. 649, 650, 73 A. 479, 480
(1909); Fiss Corp. v. National Safety Bank & Trust Co., 191 Misc. 397, 398, 77
N.Y.S.2d 293, 294 (City Ct. 1948). Another possibility leading to the same result
is that the holder is not considered to have changed position, but that the pur-
chaser's liability is reinstated on the underlying transaction. In certain cases
where a drawee certified a check despite the fact that there were insufficient
funds in the drawer's account, or that a stop payment order had been issued by
the drawer, the courts have held that the drawer was not released on either the
check or the underlying obligation, since it was the drawer's own actions that
created the situation. See Condenser Serv. & Eng'r Co. v. Mycalex Corp., 7 NJ.
Super. 427, 430, 71 A.2d 404, 406 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1950); Baldinger & Kupfer-
man Mfg. Co. v. Manufacturers-Citizens Trust Co., 93 Misc. 94, 98, 156 N.Y.S. 445,
447 (App. Term 1915); Plantation's Bank v. Desormier, 102 ILL 565, 568-69, 232
A.2d 371, 374 (1967).
108. See note 101 supra. Or, consider instead that the holder is not a holder
in due course because, by taking the check more than thirty days after its issu-
ance, he has notice that it is overdue. U.C.C. § 3-304(3) (c).
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amount of the check. As payee on the cashier's check, the car
dealer has no recourse on the instrument against the purchaser
of the check, yet under section 3-802(1),109 by accepting a check
with a bank as a drawer and without recourse against the pur-
chaser, it is likely that the car dealer has lost his cause of ac-
tion against the purchaser on the underlying obligation.
In addition to producing such anomalies, the strict applica-
tion of either sections 3-305, 3-306, or 3-418 would have an ad-
verse impact on the cash equivalency of cashier's checks. A
few courts have focused on the cash-like nature of cashier's
checks, and accordingly have prohibited banks from raising any
of their own claims or defenses against holders with whom
they have not dealt.1 10 For instance, in Kaufman v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank,"' the issuing bank had neglected to debit the
purchaser's account for the amount of a cashier's check. The
court, without even questioning whether the holder was a
holder in due course, refused to allow the bank to raise this de-
fense. It reasoned that the bank could have protected itself by
ensuring that it had received payment for the cashier's check
before issuance."1 2 Moreover, the court emphasized the policy
consideration that unless the bank's liability on the check is ab-
solute, the bank's solvency would provide insufficient protec-
tion to the holder who has decided to take a cashier's check
instead of cash.1 3
As the Kaufman opinion implies, the application of present
Code provisions to cashier's checks-an application that would
allow issuing banks to litigate with some frequency their own
defenses to payment-would strip these instruments of their
role as cash substitutes. First, because of the many reasons
that a transferee might not be considered a holder in due
course,114 application of the Code could subject transferee-
109. U.C.C. § 3-802(1) provides that "1[u]nless otherwise agreed where an in-
strument is taken for an underlying obligation (a) the obligation is pro tanto
discharged if a bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of the instrument and there
is no recourse on the instrument against the underlying obligor." For support
of the contrary proposition that the purchaser's liability on the underlying
transaction should be reinstated if the bank can refuse payment on the cash-
ier's check because of its own defense against the purchaser, see note 107
supra.
110. See Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 587, 588 (4th Cir.
1976); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
111. 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
112. Id. at 278.
113. See id. at 278-79 (quoting National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano,
111 N.J. Super. 347, 351, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970)).
114. Reasons that holders may not qualify as holders in due course include
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holders to several defenses the existence of which they are in
no position to be aware. This is because transferee-holders are
not normally party to the transactions from which the defenses
of issuing banks arise. Second, and perhaps more important,
application of the Code would frequently compel holders to
commence legal proceedings in order to recover on the check.
This result would force holders rather than banks to incur the
risk of litigation as well as the risk of the lost use of funds dur-
ing the pendency of the action.
3. The Bank's Ability to Raise the Purchaser's Claims and
Defenses
More common than the situation in which the bank has a
defense of its own to payment is the one in which the pur-
chaser of a cashier's check has a claim or defense arising from
the transaction in which he negotiated the check to the payee.
For example, goods paid for with a cashier's check may turn
out to be defective, resulting in a breach of the payee's war-
ranty of fitness. Although the purchaser of the cashier's check
may not order the bank to stop payment, 1 5 the issuing bank
may voluntarily accommodate the purchaser's request that it
refuse payment, and force the holder to bring suit for payment.
If the purchaser is unable to persuade the bank to refuse pay-
ment, the purchaser may attempt to prevent payment by as-
serting an adverse claim to the check." 6 Whether the bank or
the purchaser pursues these options depends largely upon the
ability of the bank to utilize the claims and defenses of the pur-
chaser and upon the ability of the purchaser to successfully as-
sert an adverse claim.
It is important to realize that such issues arise only when
the holder is not a holder in due course. When a cashier's
check is held by a holder in due course, it is clear that no claim
or defense of a third party may be raised by the obligor." 7
the following: failing to obtain an indorsement, U.C.C. § 1-201(20); having notice
of a claim or defense of either the purchaser or the bank, id. § 3-302(1) (c); see
note 101 supra; taking the instrument after it is overdue, U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1) (c),
-304(3) (c); or failing to give value for the instrument, U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1) (a), -303.
115. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
116. See notes 122-134 infra and accompanying text.
117. This result is reached under all three of the theories this Article has
considered regarding obligations on cashier's checks. First, under U.C.C. § 3-
305, a holder in due course takes free of all claims of all parties, and of all de-
fenses except certain real defenses of the instrument's obligor, and not of third
parties. See Wallach, supra note 23, at 590 n.44; Note, supra note 31, at 547. The
defenses of a holder with whom the obligor has dealt are inapplicable in this
factual setting, since the obligor has not dealt with the holder. Second, under
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Both common law and the Code provide that a holder in due
course of any type of negotiable instrument takes free of all
claims and defenses of third parties.11 8 This rule is based on
the judgment that society's interest in ensuring negotiability
clearly outweighs the occasional harshness of denying a third
party the right to raise a rightful claim to or defense against a
negotiable instrument." 9
When a holder is not a holder in due course, though, courts
and commentators have disagreed on the questions of whether
a bank can raise a purchaser's claims or defenses, and whether
a purchaser can assert his own adverse claims. The commenta-
tors generally take the position that in this situation the provi-
sions of the Code governing ordinary negotiable instruments
should also govern the respective rights of the parties to a cash-
ier's check.120 The courts, on the other hand, almost uniformly
take the opposite view, reasoning implicitly that the value judg-
ment exemplified by the Code-which limits the free negotia-
bility of ordinary negotiable instruments-is overridden by
society's interest in having cashier's checks serve as cash sub-
situtes.121 As a result, the courts usually ignore the Code when
a bank attempts to raise a claim or defense of the purchaser, or
when a purchaser attempts to assert an adverse claim against
an instrument held by one who is not a holder in due course.
a. Theoretical Applicability of Sections 3-306 and 3-603(1)
Sections 3-306122 and 3-603(1)123 appear to apply to the situ-
U.C.C. § 3-418, acceptance is final as to holders in due course. Thus, if cashier's
checks are considered accepted drafts, the issuing bank is absolutely liable to
the holder and cannot raise any claims or defenses of its own or of third par-
ties. Finally, if cashier's checks are regarded as cash substitutes, the bank ob-
viously cannot be permitted to raise any third-party claims or defenses against
a holder in due course.
118. U.C.C. § 3-305; N.I.L. § 57. See generally Strahorn, The Policy or Func-
tion of the Law of Bills and Notes, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 662 (1939).
119. See Strahorn, supra note 118, at 663. For a critical analysis of the value
of negotiability, see Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
375 (1971).
120. See authorities cited in note 23 supra.
121. See State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1976);
Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 9, 255 N.W.2d 856, 857-58(1977); National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 351, 268
A.2d 327, 329 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970); Tranarg v. Banca Commerciale Ital-
iana, 90 Misc. 2d 829, 832-33, 396 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Moon Over the
Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 921, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974,
976 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976). But see Leo Syntax Auto Sales v. Peoples Bank & Say.
Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 226, 229-30, 215 N.E.2d 68, 71 (1965).
122. The text of U.C.C. § 3-306 is quoted in note 38 supra.
123. U.C.C. § 3-603(1) provides:
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ation in which a bank attempts to raise a claim or defense of
the purchaser, or in which the purchaser attempts to assert an
adverse claim against a cashier's check. Section 3-306 sets out
the rules generally applied in determining the claims and de-
fenses subject to which one who is not a holder in due course
takes an instrument. Section 3-306(a) provides that a person
not having the rights of a holder in due course takes subject to
"all valid claims to [the instrument] on the part of any person,"
but does not address the issues of whether an obligor is permit-
ted or can be compelled to raise the claims of a third party.
Sections 3-306(d) and 3-603(1), however, treat these issues inso-
far as ordinary negotiable instruments are concerned. Some
commentators have assumed that these sections should also
govern whether third-party claims or defenses may be raised
against the holder of a cashier's check who is not a holder in
due course.124 An inquiry into the operation of these sections
is therefore necessary.
As a preliminary matter, the distinction between defenses
and claims of ownership must be clarified. The term "claim,"
as it is used in sections 3-306(d) and 3-603(1), encompasses both
legal and equitable claims.125 A legal claim of ownership in-
The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment or
satisfaction to the holder even though it is made with knowledge of a
claim of another person to the instrument unless prior to such pay-
ment or satisfaction the person making the claim either supplies in-
demnity deemed adequate by the party seeking the discharge or
enjoins payment or satisfaction by order of a court of competent juris-
diction in an action in which the adverse claimant and the holder are
parties. This subsection does not, however, result in the discharge of
the liability(a) of a party who in bad faith pays or satisfies a holder who ac-
quired the instrument by theft or who (unless having the
rights of a holder in due course) holds through one who so ac-
quired it; or
(b) of a party (other than an intermediary bank or a payor bank
which is not a depositary bank) who pays or satisfies the
holder of an instrument which has been restrictively indorsed
in a manner not consistent with the terms of such restrictive
indorsement.
124. See authorities cited in note 23 supra. These commentators treat the
problem as one of jus tertii-the ability of an obligor to raise the claims or de-
fenses of a third party in order to defend against his own liability on the instru-
ment. The assumption that sections 3-306(d) and 3-603(1) apply is
understandable when made by those who treat cashier's checks as notes, since
courts have consistently applied these sections to determine whether the
maker of a note can raise third-party claims or defenses. See note 36 supra.
The commentators who treat cashier's checks as accepted drafts, however, see
note 36 supra; text accompanying notes 41-42 supra, should logically apply sec-
tion 3-418, which makes acceptance final even as to certain parties who are not
holders in due course.
125. The distinction between legal claims and equitable claims and de-
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volves the assertion by the owner that he has been wrongfully
and involuntarily deprived of possession. Such claims nor-
mally arise from theft or loss of the instrument. An equitable
claim of ownership involves the assertion by the owner that he
has been induced to part voluntarily with the instrument under
circumstances that give him a right to rescind the transaction
and reclaim the instrument.12 6 Equitable claims commonly
stem from transactions involving mistake, fraud, duress, or ille-
gality.127 Both legal and equitable claims, therefore, are based
on the fact that the instrument's holder is in wrongful posses-
sion.
fenses is explained in Note, supra note 5, at 428 n.29. The classic definitions of
legal title, equitable title, and contract defenses as they apply to negotiable in-
struments were given by Professor Chafee, who formulated the following defi-
nition of legal title: "Te legal title to a negotiable instrument throughout its
existence belongs to the person to whom the promises run by the terms of the
instrument if he has possession, no matter how that possession came to him."
Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HARv. L REv. 1104, 1112 (1918). See also
W. BTrON, supra note 43, § 156, at 456-62. Under this formulation, a thief has
legal title to a negotiable instrument payable to bearer or indorsed in blank,
but a possessor under a forged instrument has no legal title because he is not a
promisee under the terms of the instrument. Chafee's distinction between eq-
uities of ownership and equities of defense is based on the dual nature of a ne-
gotiable instrument. Equities of ownership relate to the instrument as a
chatteh
It is a chattel, a tangible scrap of paper, sometimes valuable for its own
sake if sufficiently ancient or bearing the autograph of some historic
debtor... , always available for framing or even papering the walls,
for which purpose unlucky investors have used their coupon bonds. As
a chattel, it is the subject of conversion which gives rise to trover, has
been held to be covered by the designation "goods and chattels" in the
Statute of Frauds, and is taxable where situated, though the owner and
the oblgor reside elsewhere.
Chafee, supra, at 1109. Any equitable claim of right to possession of the actual
paper is therefore a claim of equitable ownership. For example, if the payee of
an instrument is induced by fraud to indorse and deliver the instrument to a
third party, the payee has an equitable right to restitution of the document.
Equities of defense relate to the negotiable instrument as a bundle of con-
tracts. Id. "Instead of being property rights .... they are set up by a defend-
ant as defenses ... to litigation on a contract." Id. at 1111. Equities of defense
are the ordinary personal defenses, such as failure of consideration, fraud, du-
ress, and nonfulfillment of a condition precedent, that can be asserted by a
party to a commercial transaction to void his payment instrument. See also
Note, Adverse Claims and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Availablep, supra
note 23, at 921-24.
U.C.C. § 3-603(1) appears, however, to adopt a different line of demarcation
between legal and equitable claims of ownership. When, for instance, bearer
paper is stolen, section 3-603(1) (a) recognizes legal title to the paper in the vic-
tim rather than the thief. See id. § 3-603, Official Comment 5.
126. See discussion of equitable claims in note 125 supra.
127. Id. See U.C.C. § 3-306, Official Comment 5. An equitable claim, of
course, must be the cause of the owner parting with the instrument, not an un-
related set-off.
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When the holder is in rightful possession of the instru-
ment, the original owner may thus raise only defenses to pay-
ment. Breach of warranty and failure of consideration on the
underlying contract are common examples of such defenses.
The circumstances that give rise to a purchaser's defenses
against a holder frequently differ only in degree from those that
give rise to equitable claims. 128 To illustrate this difference,
consider once more the example of the used car dealer who ob-
tains payment by negotiable instrument for an auto that he has
misrepresented as being free from defects. The obligor can de-
fend against its obligation on the instrument by asserting equi-
table ownership in the buyer 129 only if the misrepresentations
of the dealer were so extreme that the buyer himself would be
permitted to rescind the transaction. If the misrepresentations
were less serious, the buyer could not be the equitable owner
of the instrument and would merely have a cause of action for
breach of warranty against the dealer. The obligor, then, would
be fully liable on the instrument since he cannot defend
against payment by invoking a mere defense of the buyer.130
It may appear puzzling that the Code would allow obligors
in this situation to defend against payment on negotiable in-
struments by asserting third-party claims, but not by raising
third-party defenses. This distinction does not reflect any con-
scious value judgment that claims of ownership are more meri-
torious than ordinary defenses. 131 Rather, it simply represents
the draftsmen's intent to permit an obligor to raise a claim of
ownership against a holder when the obligor cannot obtain a
discharge by paying the holder under section 3-603(1).132 Sec-
tion 3-603(1) is essentially a codification of the common law
rules of discharge 33 aimed at alleviating some of the problems
128. See Note, Adverse Claims and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protec-
tion Available?, supra note 23, at 924.
129. The U.C.C. does not define claims of ownership, but leaves this deter-
mination to state law on rescission. See U.C.C. § 3-306, Official Comment 5.
130. See Wallach, supra note 23, at 589.
131. Of course, it does indirectly evince such a value judgment since under
U.C.C. § 3-603(1) an obligor will obtain a discharge by payment to a holder who
has notice of a defense of a third party notwithstanding indemnification or in-
junction, or even to a holder who has notice of an equitable claim, unless the
obligor is indemnified or the third party obtains an injunction. An obligor will
not obtain a discharge with notice of a legal claim of ownership. For a discus-
sion of the distinction between legal and equitable claims, see notes 125-126
supra and accompanying text.
132. For the full text of U.C.C. § 3-603(1), see note 123 supra.
133. See Note, Personal Money Orders and Teller's Checks: Mavericks Under
the UCC, supra note 23, at 544, 545; Note, supra note 5, at 431; Note, Adverse
[Vol. 64.275
BANK CHECKS
that existed under the discharge provisions of the N.I.L.134
Under the N.I.L., there was confusion about the ability of
an obligor to obtain a discharge from liability by paying an in-
strument's holder when the obligor had knowledge of a third-
party claim of ownership. 135 The rule was that if the obligor did
not pay in due course, he was not discharged from liability on
the instrument and could be successfully sued by the real own-
er.136 Thus, if an obligor only had notice of an ordinary defense
against the instrument, he could pay in due course since the
rightful owner would be known.137 Notice of a claim of owner-
ship, however, whether legal or equitable, was generally suffi-
cient to disable the obligor from paying in due course. 138 A
nonholder could therefore force an obligor to voice a third-
party claim of ownership simply by giving the obligor notice.
The inability of obligors to obtain a discharge by paying the
holder once notice of a claim of ownership had been given cre-
ated the distinct possibility of double liability. 39 If an obligor
paid the holder, the third-party claimant needed only to prove
the validity of his claim in order to hold the obligor liable. If,
on the other hand, the obligor refused to pay the holder, he ex-
posed himself to the costs of defending a lawsuit brought by
the holder. Moreover, even if the holder's suit was successful,
the obligor was still potentially liable to the third-party claim-
ant in a subsequent action on the instrument. Since the third-
party claimant would not ordinarily be a party in the holder's
action, he would not be bound by the results of the holder's ac-
tion.'40 Contradictory results were therefore possible because,
in an action for payment brought by a holder, an obligor rarely
had information sufficient to present the best case for the third-
party claimant.
The draftsmen of the Code sought to alleviate these risks
by removing the possibility of double liability.141 Reverting to
Claims and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protection Available'? supra note
23, at 923.
134. See Note, supra note 5, at 431; Comment, Adverse Claims Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Survey and Proposals, 65 YALE LJ. 807, 812
(1956).
135. See Note, Ju Tertii Under Common Law and the N.L., 26 ST. JoHN's
L. REV. 135, 138 (1951); Comment, supra note 134, at 810-12.
136. See generally authorities cited in note 135 supra.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Comment, supra note 134, at 811.
141. See Comment, Adverse Claims and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment
Protection Available7 supra note 23, at 920; Comment, supra note 134, at 812-13.
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the common law approach, they established more liberal rules
for discharge. With respect to equitable claims of third parties,
Code section 3-603(1) permits obligors, even if they have had
notice, to obtain discharge by paying the holder unless the
third-party claimant insulates the obligor from double liability
by either of two methods: posting an indemnity bond, or ob-
taining an injunction in a court action to which both the holder
and the obligor are party. With respect to legal claims of own-
ership, on the other hand, section 3-603(1) provides that notice
of a third-party claim disables the obligor from obtaining a dis-
charge by paying the holder.142 Two reasons support the differ-
ent treatment the Code accords legal claims. First, if obligors
are prohibited from obtaining discharge when, with notice, they
pay a holder whose title can be traced to a thief, this will act as
a strong incentive for obligors to make it more difficult for
thieves to transfer or obtain payment on negotiable instru-
ments. 143 Second, it should be significantly easier for an obli-
gor to prove that an instrument has been stolen than to prove
that a third party has an equitable right to rescind the convey-
ance of an instrument.
The provisions of section 3-306(d) were developed to com-
plement section 3-603(1).14 Under section 3-306(d), obligors
can raise the claims or defenses of a third party only when the
obligors need to avoid the possibility of double liability, that is,
when an adverse claim can be asserted. Thus, an obligor may
always raise a third party's legal claim of ownership in an ac-
tion for payment by the holder. The Code permits obligors to
assert such claims regardless of whether the third-party claim-
ant is party to the suit, since obligors cannot obtain a discharge
by paying the holder if the obligor has notice of the legal
claim.145 Obligors, however, may raise the equitable claim of a
142. U.C.C. § 3-603(1) (a).
143. Id. § 3-306, Official Comment 5.
144. See U.C.C. § 3-306, Official Comment 5.
Section 3-306 of the U.C.C. provides:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes
the instrument subject to . . . (d) the defense that he or a person
through whom he holds the instrument acquired it by theft, or that
payment or satisfaction to such holder would be inconsistent with the
terms of a restrictive indorsement. The claim of any third person to
the instrument is not otherwise available as a defense to any party lia-
ble thereon unless the third person himself defends the action for such
party.
145. See U.C.C. § 3-603(1) (a). There is, nevertheless, a risk of double liabil-
ity in this situation. If the holder is successful in his action against the obligor,
the judgment, because it is not res judicata as to the third-party claimant not
party to the action, fails to protect the obligor in a subsequent action by that
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third party only when the third party defends the action for the
obligor. This is because the obligor may discharge his liability
by paying the holder except when the third-party claimant in-
demnifies the obligor or obtains a judgment restraining pay-
ment. Consequently, there is no need to allow an obligor to
raise the equitable claim of a third party unless the claimant
defends the suit for the obligor.14 Finally, obligors may never
raise the ordinary defenses of third parties, because obligors
may discharge their obligation by paying the holder even when
they have notice of the defenses.
If sections 3-306 and 3-603(1) were applied to cashier's
checks, both the issuing bank and the purchaser would be dis-
abled from asserting the purchaser's ordinary defenses in an
action for payment brought by the holder. Only the pur-
chaser's adverse claims of ownership would be available to the
bank for resisting payment. Commentators have assumed such
an application to be wholly proper, apparently because of the
absence of any other Code provisions that seem to treat the
matter.147 This assumption, however, ignores the possibility
that the differences between society's perceptions of ordinary
negotiable instruments and cashier's checks may merit a differ-
ent formulation of the rights of parties to cashier's checks. This
possibility militates strongly against applying sections 3-306
and 3-603 (1) to cashier's checks. Failing to apply these sections
does not appear to contravene the intention of the draftsmen,
for there is no indication that they expected these sections to
govern cashier's checks. 148
If cashier's checks are to be viable cash substitutes, even
the title of one who is not a holder in due course should be su-
perior to a third party's adverse claim of ownership. In a cash
transaction, the transferee has use of the funds during the pen-
dency of any action arising out of the transfer. If the transferor,
claimant. The draftsmen must have felt that the ease of proving lack of legal
title, even without the assistance of the true owner, and the strong public pol-
icy interest against aiding thieves outweighed this risk of double liability.
146. This protects obligors against double liability since they can obtain dis-
charge by paying holders unless a third-party claimant is able to prove, in an
action in which all interested parties are present, that the true owner of the in-
strument is the third-party claimant. Similarly, obligors cannot totally avoid
payment, and thus be unjustly enriched, by succeeding in separate suits
against the holder and the third-party claimant.
147. See generally authorities cited in note 23 supra.
148. The cases that have been cited for the proposition that adverse claim
procedures apply to bank checks have involved certified checks. See generally
Note, supra note 5. No pre-U.C.C. or post-U.C.C. cases have permitted adverse
claims against a cashier's check.
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by attachment, deprives the transferee of the use of the cash,
he must indemnify the transferee against wrongful attach-
ment.149 Applying sections 3-306 and 3-603(1) to cashier's
checks, however, would permit a purchaser to assert his claim
of ownership merely by posting a bond indemnifying the bank,
not the holder. During the ensuing lawsuit, the holder would
not only lose the use of funds, but would also incur the costs of
litigation. Thus, sections 3-306 and 3-603(1) clearly provide an
unsatisfactory framework for regulating cashier's checks. The
value judgments underlying these sections apply to ordinary
negotiable instruments, not to cashier's checks.150
b. Refusal of Courts to Apply Sections 3-306 and 3-603(1)
Realizing that sections 3-306(a), 3-306(d), and 3-603(1)
would prevent cashier's checks from fulfilling their perceived
role as cash equivalents, courts have avoided applying them to
cashier's checks.15 1 Unfortunately, the courts have often cited
inappropriate Code sections to justify this result.152
The courts have reasoned that to permit a bank to raise the
claims or defenses of a check's purchaser would destroy the
utility of cashier's checks as "executed sales of credit" or cash
substitutes. As a result, in virtually every case involving the
negotiation of a cashier's check to a holder whose title is ques-
tionable, the courts have denied banks the opportunity to raise
the purchaser's defenses or claims as a defense against its obli-
gation to pay.153 Similarly, no court has allowed a purchaser or
149. Most jurisdictions require the posting of a bond as a condition prece-
dent to the issuance of a writ of attachment. See, e.g., CAL. CIrV. PROC. CODE
§ 489.220(a) (West 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, § 4(a)-(b) (Smith-Hurd 1963);
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 6212(b) (McKinney 1964).
150. The application of section 3-418 to cashier's checks is more satisfactory
than the application of sections 3-306 and 3-603(1), but it too is inadequate to
ensure any independent function for such checks. Under section 3-418, the
holder, if he is a holder in due course or has changed position in reliance on the
receipt of the check, takes free of any third-party claims or defenses. If the
holder does not qualify under either class of protected persons, he will be sub-
ject to all of the purchaser's claims or defenses. If the courts broadly interpret
the phrases "holder in due course" and "good faith change of position," the
holder might be protected in every situation where commercial necessity dic-
tates protection. But the vagueness of these standards permits banks, or the
purchasers who assert adverse claims, to require a check's holder to commence
a lawsuit to prove that acceptance is final as to him. Thus, section 3-418 fails to
shift the risk of litigation or the risk of lost use of funds away from the holder.
151. See cases cited in note 121 supra.
152. See cases cited in note 50 supra.
153. See, e.g., cases cited in note 121 supra. There were several pre-U.C.C.
cases that permitted the bank to raise the purchaser's claims or defenses. See,
e.g., First Natl Bank v. Associates Inv. Co., 140 Ind. App. 394, 221 N.E.2d 684
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any other third party to assert an adverse claim to a cashier's
check.154 In fact, at least four cases have held by implication
that the equitable claim of a purchaser or other third party to a
cashier's check is inferior even to the title of one who is not a
holder in due course, and that, therefore, no such claim can be
asserted by a resisting bank. 5
5
The most widely cited of these cases is National Newark &
Essex Bank v. Giordano,15 6 in which the issue presented was
whether a bank issuing a cashier's check was liable to the pur-
chaser when the bank had paid the check over a stop payment
order and an offer to post an indemnity bond. The court, find-
ing the bank not liable, stated: "A cashier's check circulates in
the commercial world as the equivalent of cash .... People
would no longer be willing to accept it as a substitute for cash
if they could not be sure that there would be no difficulty in
converting it into cash."'157 In National Newark, the purchaser
may have had an equitable claim to the check since the holder
allegedly misrepresented the quality of the goods given in ex-
change for the check. 58 The court reasoned, however, that the
(1966). See generally H. BAILEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS.§ 13.7 (4th ed. 1969).
However, there is only one post-U.C.C. case that has permitted a bank to raise
either the claims or defenses of a purchaser. See Leo Syntax Auto Sales v.
Peoples Bank & Say. Co., 214 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio 1965). In Syntax, an action
brought by one who was not a holder in due course, the court ignored the
U.C.C. and applied pre-U.C.C. law, permitting a bank to raise not only the pur-
chaser's equitable claim of rescission for fraud, but also the purchaser's breach
of warranty defense. The purchaser was not a party to the action. Even the
commentators who view cashier's checks as notes have criticized the Syntax
court for failing to properly apply section 3-306(d). See, e.g., 6D W. WILnER & F.
HART, supra note 23, § 4-403, at 2-1194.
154. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court has held, in
Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 58 A.D. 2d 103, 106-07, 396 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416-
17 (1977), affd mem., 44 N.Y.2d 776, 377 N.E.2d 474, 406 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1978), that a
stop payment order issued by a purchaser is not sufficient to compel a bank to
refuse to pay a cashier's check. In dictum, however, the court stated that the
purchaser could have asserted an adverse claim by complying with the require-
ments of U.C.C. § 3-603(1). 58 A.D.2d at 106-07, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 417. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, without referring to the ability of a purchaser to assert an ad-
verse claim under U.C.C. § 3-603(1). 44 N.Y.2d 776, 377 N.E.2d 474, 406 N.Y.S.2d
30 (1978).
155. See State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1976); Na-
tional Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970); Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland
Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976); Tranarg v. Banca
Comnmerciale Italiana, 90 Misc. 2d 829, 396 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See also
Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 255 N.W.2d 856 (1977)
(money order).
156. 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970).
157. Id. at 351-52, 268 A.2d at 329 (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 353, 268 A.2d at 329-30.
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bank had accepted the check upon issuance and that, since it is
impossible to stop payment on a check once it is accepted, 159
the bank could not raise even the purchaser's equitable claim
of ownership as a defense to its obligation on the check. Im-
plicit in this reasoning is the judgment that the title of a holder
who is not a holder in due course is superior to a purchaser's
equitable claim of ownership or, in other words, that section 3-
306 (a) does not apply to cashier's checks. In attempting to rec-
oncile its holding with the Code, the court relied on section 4-
403(1) for the proposition that the purchaser has no right to
stop payment on a cashier's check. This is unfortunate since,
as previously discussed,160 the purchaser's inability to stop
payment on a cashier's check does not determine whether the
bank can raise the purchaser's claims or defenses, or whether
the purchaser can assert an adverse claim.
In Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland
Bank,16 1 the court agreed that the role of cashier's checks as a
cash substitute would be subverted if an issuing bank could be
compelled to resist payment and raise the purchaser's claims
or defenses, merely because the purchaser has agreed to in-
demnify the bank against liability.162 In Moon Over the Moun-
tain, the bank attempted to raise as a defense the purchaser's
contention that the goods received from the holder were defec-
tive. 163 Although the case involved a defense rather than a
claim of ownership, the court made no distinction between the
bank's ability to raise either the claims or defenses of the pur-
chaser. Like the court in National Newark, the Moon Over the
Mountain court also invoked an inapplicable Code section to
justify its holding. The court noted that under section 3-802(1)
the purchaser's liability to the holder on the underlying trans-
action is discharged when the holder accepts the cashier's
check; it therefore concluded that the bank should not be able
to raise the purchaser's claims or defenses since the holder
would then be left without a remedy.164 Although this result is
compelled by the interest the court notes in maintaining the
cash-like nature of cashier's checks, section 3-802(1) does not
support the court's conclusion. Unlike the case in which a bank
raises its own defenses and thus totally deprives the holder of
159. Id. at 351-52, 268 A.2d at 329.
160. See text accompanying notes 51-59 supra.
161. 87 Misc. 2d 918, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976).
162. Id. at 923-24, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 977-78.
163. Id. at 919, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
164. Id. at 920-21, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
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any recovery, if a bank were permitted to raise the purchaser's
defenses, the holder would be liable only to the extent of a set-
off in the amount that the purchaser would have recovered in a
separate action against the holder.
The desire of courts to ensure that cashier's checks retain
the characteristics of cash equivalency is probably most appar-
ent in the case of State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell.165 In
that case, the purchaser of a cashier's check obtained a tempo-
rary injunction which prohibited the issuing bank from paying
a transferee of the check who was not a holder in due course.
The purchaser alleged that the payee had accepted the check
with the clear intention of not performing his part of the con-
tract.166 This action by the payee would clearly create an equi-
table claim to the check on the part of the purchaser.167 On
appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court dissolved the injunction
even though it almost surely left the purchaser without any
possibility of recovery. The facts in Chan Siew Lai could not
have been more favorable for the purchaser. The payee was a
resident and citizen of Hong Kong; the holder was a party to
the action, begun in Missouri, but the payee was not. Since the
injunction was denied, the court left the purchaser with two un-
realistic alternatives: enforcing a judgment obtained in Mis-
souri against the payee in Hong Kong, or commencing an
independent action in Hong Kong. Although the Chan Siew
Lai court also attempted to justify its decision by arguing the
inability of a purchaser to issue a stop payment order under
section 4-303(1) (a), its extensive quotation of the National New-
ark case1 6 8 reveals that the actual reason behind its holding
was that "public policy does not favor a rule that would permit
stopping payment of [cashier's checks]. "169
These decisions enforcing payment of checks in favor of
holders wlho are not holders in due course affirm the fact that
courts view cashier's checks as cash substitutes. The disregard
of these courts, however, for apparently applicable provisions
of the Code, such as sections 3-306 and 3-603(1), and their resort
to clearly inapplicable Code sections, such as sections 4-403(1)
and 3-802(1), diminishes the utility of the Code as a commercial
165. 536 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1976).
166. Id. at 15.
167. See notes 125-127 supra and accompanying text.
168. See State ex reL Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d at 16 (quoting Na-
tional Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 351-52, 268 A.2d
327, 329 (1970)); text accompanying note 49 supra.
169. 536 S.W.2d at 16.
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planning aid. The problem is simple. In framing sections 3-306
and 3-603(1), the draftsmen of the Code considered only ordi-
nary negotiable instruments. Apparently, they gave little
thought to the independent commercial function of cashier's
checks. The solution is equally simple. The integrity of the
Code and the independent commercial function of cashier's
checks can both be guaranteed by amending the Code to ex-
plicitly set forth the respective rights and liabilities of parties
to cashier's checks.
C. A PROGRAM FOR REvIsION
In amending the Code, the draftsmen would find it neces-
sary to balance society's interest in protecting issuing banks
and check purchasers against society's interest in having cash-
ier's checks function as viable cash substitutes. Commentators
have generally favored the interests of banks and purchasers,
thus inferentially supporting amendments that would permit
the assertion of all claims to or defenses against cashier's
checks in the possession of one who is not a holder in due
course.17 0 Their disagreement with the value judgment made
by the National Newark line of cases-that cashier's checks
should be treated as cash equivalents-is apparently based on
the assumption that cashier's checks serve only two functions:
providing a single transaction checking account much like a
personal money order, and assuring the holder of a solvent ob-
ligor. Because these commentators apprehend that the pri-
mary purpose of the Code is to provide a means for equitable,
after-the-fact resolution of disputes arising from commercial
transactions, they fail to appreciate the cost savings that would
be generated if the Code permitted more certainty in the plan-
ning of commercial transactions.
One reason for this diversity of opinion between courts and
commentators is that the latter envision the model transaction
as one involving a consumer sale in which a fly-by-night opera-
tor, requiring payment by cashier's check, takes advantage of
an unprotected and ignorant consumer.171 Viewing the transac-
tion from the point where the dispute eventually arises rather
than from the point where the check was initially negotiated,
they reason that the parties deserving protection are the de-
170. See Wallach, supra note 23, at 597; Note, supra note 5, at 439; Note, Ad-
verse Claims and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protection Available?, supra
note 23, at 926.
171. See generally authorities cited in note 170 supra.
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frauded purchaser and the normally unconcerned stakeholder,
the bank. The commentators would protect the bank by per-
nitting it to pay the proceeds of the disputed check into
court.172 The purchaser, in turn, would be protected by al-
lowing him to litigate his defenses prior to the dissipation of
the funds by the holder.
There are several serious problems with the commentators'
position. First, subjecting holders to the purchasers' or the
banks' defenses deprives cashier's checks of their independent
function in commercial transactions: serving as a cash substi-
tute. The possibility that holders in due course may be re-
quired to commence lawsuits simply to establish their right to
payment will discourage them from accepting cashier's checks.
This disincentive is even stronger when the holder has not
dealt with the purchaser, and would not otherwise be subject to
any suit based on the underlying transaction asserted by the
purchaser. The only protection offered to the holder of a cash-
ier's check, then, would be the assurance of a solvent obligor.
Even this protection could be withdrawn, however, if the con-
sideration received by the bank fails. Cashier's checks so per-
ceived would serve no independent purpose in transactions
where the holder is unconcerned about the purchaser's sol-
vency, or wishes to shift the risk of the lost use of funds to the
purchaser. This is ironic since these considerations are central
to most transactions in which cashier's checks are currently
used.
A second problem with the commentators' position is that
few cashier's check transactions involve unethical sellers tak-
ing advantage of unwary consumers. On the contrary, most in-
volve bargained-for exchanges in which the purchaser of the
check, often a business, gives up its right to use an ordinary
check (on which it could stop payment) in exchange for receiv-
ing a lower price, or as a precondition to the other party's par-
ticipation. If cashier's checks are not permitted to serve as
cash substitutes, the parties to commercial transactions will be
deprived of a valuable bargaining tool. There is no reason to
destroy a commercially useful cash substitute simply because
some consumers have been mistreated in transactions involv-
ing it. Such abuses do not arise from the use of the cashier's
checks per se, but from the fraudulent nature of the underlying
172. See Fox, supra note 23, at 695-96; Note, supra note 5, at 440-41; Com-
ment, Uniform Commercial Code-Stop Payment Orders-Cashier's and Teller's
Checks, 23 N.Y. L ScH. L. RE V. 518 (1978).
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transaction. Effective consumer protection, then, should attack
the real evils of that transaction, such as misrepresented prod-
ucts or inadequate disclosure, rather than the neutral commer-
cial instrument used to finalize the transaction.
The better position, therefore, calls for amending the Code
in a way that ensures that cashier's checks will serve as substi-
tutes for cash. Guaranteeing cash equivalency for cashier's
checks would require that holders take them free from all
claims and virtually all defenses. These instruments then
could offer both the finality of payment associated with cash
and the security from loss provided by specially indorsed in-
struments. More specifically, the Code should be amended to
provide that a holder of a cashier's check takes the instrument
free from all defenses of the bank, and from all claims-both le-
gal173 and equitable-and defenses of all other parties except
for the defenses of alteration and forged indorsement. Since in-
stances of alteration are rare, this exception would detract very
little from the cash equivalence of the instrument. The other
risk that would still be incurred by the recipients of cashier's
checks is that their check may bear a forged indorsement.
Since a forged indorsement would mean that the bearer of the
instrument would not be considered a holder,174 the issuing
bank would be under no duty to pay on the check. These two
defenses are necessary to ensure that cashier's checks serve
their second function: protecting against the risks of theft and
of other losses that inhere in the use of cash.
This sort of amendment, of course, would require that
banks exercise more restraint in issuing cashier's checks, since
they will be liable even if the consideration given for a check
fails. If a bank wishes to accommodate a customer by issuing a
check prior to receiving consideration, it must gauge the good-
will it generates by premature issuance against the risk of loss
it incurs. Under these amendments, banks will also be less
likely to use cashier's checks as their own personal checks.
173. It is open to question whether one who is not a holder in due course
should take free of legal claims of ownership. The interest in preserving the
cash-like nature of cashier's checks certainly militates in favor of limiting the
risks that must be incurred by a recipient of a cashier's check. On the other
hand, if cashier's checks are to have any advantage over cash, their recipients
should assume at least the risk that each indorsement is genuine. See note 24
supra.
174. U.C.C. § 3-404(1) provides that a forged signature is inoperative and,
under U.C.C. § 1-201(20), a holder is a person who is in possession of an instru-
ment indorsed to him. Thus, if there is a forged indorsement in a recipient's
chain of title, he cannot be a holder of the instrument.
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Banks that desire to reserve control over their checks, perhaps
by the right to stop payment, should instead use teller's
checks. 17 5 Finally, the proposed change would force purchasers
of cashier's checks to exercise more discretion. They should
use these instruments only when they are willing to give up the
right to stop payment.176 The Code, thus amended, could edu-
cate purchasers about the possible drawbacks of using cash-
ier's checks by requiring that cashier's checks carry a warning
that their use will foreclose the purchaser from stopping pay-
ment or raising any defenses.
This approach to amending the Code limits the ways in
which banks and purchasers may preserve the proceeds of
cashier's checks as funds from which they may satisfy claims
arising from underlying transactions. Thus, if the party against
whom a claim or defense exists has transferred the check in a
nonfraudulent conveyance, the subsequent holder will take the
check free of any claim177 or defense. If, on the other hand, the
original holder retains the check, the bank and the purchaser
each have certain remedies. In most jurisdictions, if the bank
has dealt with the holder, the local rules of civil procedure will
permit the bank to raise its claims in the form of a counter-
claim to the holder's action for payment.178 The purchaser, al-
though denied this remedy, will often have the ability to
attach17 9 or garnish' 80 the check, thus enabling him to litigate
175. See notes 244-278 infra and accompanying text.
176. U.C.C. § 4-403(1), which codifies the common law rule, provides that
"[a] customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item payable for
his account." The common law rule and some of the costs associated with it
are examined in Homer, The Stop Payment Order, 2 BAYLOR L. REV. 275 (1950);
Moore, Sussman & Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to
Stop Payment of Checks, 42 YALE UJ. 817 (1933); Morrison & Sneed, Bank Col-
lections: The Stop-Payment Transaction-A Comparative Study, 32 TEx. L
REV. 259 (1954); Note, Stopping Payment of Checks, 79 BANKInG I. 185 (1962);
Note, Stop Payment and the Uniform Commercial Code, 28 IND. UJ. 95 (1952).
177. Absent a fraudulent conveyance, the plaintiff cannot attach an instru-
ment unless the defendant has an interest in it. Reich v. Spiegel, 208 Misc. 225,
140 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 1955); see Smith v. Amherst Acres, Inc., 42 A.D.2d
1038, 348 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1973). In County Nat'l Bank v. Inter-County Farmers
Coop. Ass'n, 65 Misc. 2d 446, 317 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1970), the court held that
an assignment in good faith and for value had priority over the claim of a credi-
tor of the assignor where the lien of the creditor had not been perfected before
the assignment.
178. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5201(b) (McKinney 1978). California
limits attachment to actions against business entities or the business assets of
individuals. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 483.010(c) (West 1979). Missouri limits the
grounds for attachment to 14 specific cases involving mainly fraudulent convey-
ances and nonresident defendants. Mo. REV. STAT. § 521.010 (1969). Several
states require the party seeking attachment to post a bond indemnifying the
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his claims before the holder can dissipate the funds. Enacting
these amendments would allow cashier's checks to become ef-
fective cash substitutes and simultaneously facilitate the use of
the Code as an aid in planning commercial transactions. 181
IV. CERTIFIED CHECKS
A. THE NATURE OF CERTIFIED CHECKS: PRE-CODE TREATMENT
A certified check is a personal check that has been ac-
cepted by the drawee bank. 82 Banks may certify a check at
the request of either its holder or its drawer. By accepting or
"certifying"'18 3 a check, the bank undertakes the acceptor's con-
tractual obligation to pay the check according to its terms at
the time of its acceptance. 84 In consideration for undertaking
this liability, the bank can immediately debit the drawer's ac-
count for the amount of the check.
Certified checks have been used in this country for over 130
holder from losses resulting from wrongful attachment. See, e.g., CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE § 489.210 (West 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, § 4(a)-(b) (Smith-
Hurd 1963); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 6212(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977). Others re-
quire that a debt represented by a negotiable instrument can be attached only
by levy on the person in possession of the instrument See, e.g., CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE § 488.400(a) (West 1979); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 5201(c) (4) (McKin-
ney 1978); Standard Factors Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 182 Misc. 701, 50
N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1944), af'd, 269 A.D. 658, 53 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1945); Finn v.
National City Bank, 36 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1942). In cases involving
cashier's checks, the Code could establish a special procedure that would per-
mit attachment of a cashier's check after a bond indemnifying the holder from
damages for wrongful attachment had been posted.
180. Garnishment will provide only limited protection, however, because of
the constraints imposed on the right to garnish. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) (requiring pregarnishment hearing). But see Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
181. If the U.C.C. is not amended to deny banks and purchasers the right to
raise claims and defenses against one who is not a holder in due course, it
should at least be amended to protect such holders from the unjustified asser-
tion of claims and defenses. The U.C.C. could require that prior to the asser-
tion of an adverse claim, the third-party claimant must indemnify not only the
bank but also the holder for his costs and attorney's fees should the claim be
unsuccessful. This requirement would at least protect a holder in due course
from having to expend unreimbursed sums merely to prove his entitlement to
the proceeds of the check. See Note, supra note 5, at 442; Comment, supra note
134, at 815-16.
182. H. BAnEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKs § 10.1 (5th ed. 1979).
183. "Certification of a check is acceptance ...." U.C.C. § 3-411(1).
184. U.C.C. § 3-410(1) provides that "[a]cceptance is the drawee's signed en-
gagement to honor the draft as presented," and U.C.C. § 3-413(1) provides that
"[t]he maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instrument according to
its tenor at the time of his engagement."
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years, 85 but in recent years their use has steadily decreased
because of the rise of computerized check processing systems.
Certified checks cannot be easily processed through these com-
puter systems, 18 6 so banks now use cashier's checks, which can
be easily processed, whenever possible. Nevertheless, certified
checks continue in use due mostly to various statutes that call
for them. 18 7
An understanding of the common law treatment of certified
checks is essential to an appreciation of the Code's deficiencies
with respect to these instruments. Under pre-Code law, the le-
gal consequences of check certification differed greatly depend-
ing on whether certification had been procured by the drawer
or the holder.188 Holders normally had personal checks certi-
fied in lieu of receiving final payment in cash. Although banks
were under no obligation to certify checks' 89 for holders, they
occasionally did so for a fee.190 Under pre-Code law, this type
of certification involved two distinct transactions: the holder's
cashing of the drawer's personal check, and the holder's
purchasing of the certifying bank's check or note.191 After cer-
tification was obtained, the holder looked to the bank for pay-
ment, and the drawer was released from liability both on the
check and on the underlying obligation.192 The drawer lost his
right to stop payment on the check once it was certified and the
bank could no longer raise any of the drawer's defenses as a
185. See Steffen & Starr, A Blue Printfor the Certified Check, 13 N.C. L. REv.
450, 450 n.2 (1935).
186. For a discussion of the problems banks encounter in processing certi-
fied checks through computerized check processing systems, see H. BAMEY,
supra note 182, § 10.1; Windsor, The Certified Check A Special Handling Item
in Automation, 81 BANKING L.J. 480 (1964).
187. Some statutes require that only certified checks can be substituted for
cash. See, e.g., Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1835(B) (1956) (bids for irrigation dis-
tricts); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1636 (Purdon 1962) (bids for public printing and
binding). Courts have held that the use of cashier's checks does not constitute
compliance with statutes of this type. See Perry v. West, 110 N.L 351, 353-54,
266 A.2d 849, 851-52 (1970); State ex rel. Babcock v. Perkins, 165 Ohio St. 185,
187-89, 134 N.E.2d 839, 842-43 (1956); Bowie County v. Farmers' Guar. State
Bank, 289 S.W. 451,452-53 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). But see Hornung v. Town of W.
New York, 82 NJ.L. 266, 267, 81 A. 1116, 1116 (Sup. Ct. 1911). See also Lord, Cer-
tified Checks and Funds Redirection, 24 ViLT. I REv. 28, 30 (1978).
188. Roberts & Morris, The Effect of a Stop Payment Order on a Certified
Check, 5 Wyo. L.J. 170, 172 (1951).
189. Wachtel v. Rosen, 249 N.Y. 386, 164 N.E. 326 (1928); H. BATnEY, supra
note 182, § 10.2.
190. See H. BAnLEY, supra note 182, § 10.2.
191. See id. § 7.6.
192. See id. § 10.8; Roberts & Morris, supra note 188, at 172; Steffen & Starr,
supra note 185, at 457.
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basis for rescinding certification.193
The common law regarding drawer-procured certification
recognized that it was obtained for substantially different rea-
sons than holder-procured certification. Normally, a drawer
would obtain certification for the purpose of adding a bank's
name to his own credit, thus encouraging the payee to accept a
check instead of cash.194 The subsequent negotiation of the
check was not treated as a cash payment from the drawer to
the holder, since courts treated the certifying transaction as
simply adding the bank's liability to that of the drawer-much
like the cumulative liability of a guarantor of a promissory
note.195 The drawer remained liable on both the check and the
underlying obligation.196 In some states, the drawer could stop
payment on a certified check, and, so long as the check was not
held by a holder in due course, the bank could raise any of the
drawer's claims or defenses as grounds for rescinding its certifi-
cation.197 Thus, the holder of a certified check often received
merely the security of a more financially secure obligor. More-
over, the drawer often retained the ability to shift the risks of
litigation and of the loss of the use of funds to the holder de-
spite the certification.
The fact that banks could raise drawers' defenses when-
ever certification had been procured by a drawer conflicted
sharply with the public's impression of certified checks as cash
equivalents. 198 Some commentators questioned whether this
treatment would undermine public confidence in certified
checks and weaken the instrument's capacity to serve as a cash
substitute. 99 In apparent response to these criticisms, the
draftsmen of Articles 3 and 4 altered the common law rule.
Certification, whether procured by the drawer or the holder,
was made the equivalent of final payment.200 As a result, draw-
193. See Roberts & Morris, supra note 188, at 175; Steffen & Start, supra note
185, at 457. If, however, a bank has certified the check by mistake and thus has
a defense of its own, the certification can be rescinded so long as the holder has
not changed position in reliance on the certification. H. BATTEY, supra note 182,
at § 10.11.
194. See Roberts & Morris, supra note 188, at 172.
195. Id. at 173. See also Steffen & Starr, supra note 185, at 468.
196. See H. BATTEY, supra note 182, § 10.8; Roberts & Morris, supra note 188,
at 173.
197. See H. BAILEY, supra note 182, § 20.10; Roberts & Morris, supra note 188,
at 182-83; Steffen & Starr, supra note 185, at 458.
198. See Roberts & Morris, supra note 188, at 180; Steffen & Starr, supra note
185, at 476.
199. See authorities cited in note 198 supra.
200. U.C.C. § 3-418, which governs both certification and payment of checks,
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ers were denied the right to issue stop payment orders even
when certification was drawer-procured. 20 1 Also, banks were
prohibited from rescinding certification except where, under
the same circumstances, they could have recovered monies
paid by mistake.20 2 The only common law distinction retained
in the Code was that the drawer is released when the holder
has obtained certification, but not when the drawer himself has
procured it.203
Unfortunately, these provisions fell short of remedying the
deficiencies in the common law, and certified checks today re-
main unsuitable as cash substitutes. The Code's treatment of
certification as analogous to final payment is an insufficient in-
centive for taking a certified check in lieu of cash. The risk of
litigation still rests on the check holder. Furthermore, a trans-
feree of a certified check, who has not even dealt with the party
attempting to raise defenses against the check, takes subject to
this risk. By imposing such risks on holders of certified checks
and their transferees, the Code burdens the use of certified
checks with substantial costs that do not occur when payment
is in cash. If certified checks are ever to serve as cash substi-
tutes, the Code must be amended to eliminate these counter-
productive costs.
B. THE EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION: CURRENT TREATMENT OF
CERTIFIED CHECKS
Under the Code, a bank that has certified a check is liable
to the holder unless the bank has a right to rescind its certifica-
tion.2°4 Section 3-418 sets forth the standard for determining
see U.C.C. § 3-411(1), appears to make certification final whenever payment
would be final. But see notes 211-214 infra and accompanying text.
201. U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(a).
202. Id. § 3-418. See note 200 supra.
203. U.C.C. § 3-411(1). Even this distinction was eliminated in the May 1941
draft of the Code. See STATE OF NEW YoRic, REPORT OF THE LAw REVISION COM-
MISSION FOR 1955: STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1034 (1955).
Drawer liability was thought to be unnecessary because upon certification the
drawer "lost control over the funds and the right to stop payment," and be-
cause certification is generally procured by the party "who finds it more conve-
nient to visit the bank." Id. This change from the common law treatment drew
the criticism that holders might not be satisfied with having only the bank's ob-
ligation. Id. In the final draft, however, the distinction was retained. The con-
tinued retention of this distinction, simply because of speculation that holders
may not be satisfied with banks as sole obligors, is highly questionable in light
of the extraordinary infrequency of bank insolvencies. See note 19 supra. Any
U.C.C. amendment treating certified checks as cash equivalents should be ac-
companied by an amendment abolishing this distinction.
204. U.C.C. §§ 3-413(1), -418.
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when certification is final: certification is final in favor of a
"holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith
changed his position in reliance on the payment. ' '205 This sec-
tion codifies the doctrine of Price v. Neal,20 6 a case which held
that a payor bank cannot recover payment made on a check
bearing a forged drawer's signature. Section 3-418 also sets
forth the general rule that in the absence of a breach of a pre-
senter's warranty,20 7 a bank cannot rescind its certification
when certification is deemed final.20 8
Unlike the provisions of sections 3-305 and 3-306 for parties
to ordinary negotiable instruments, 20 9 section 3-418 does not
provide a comprehensive scheme governing the rights of the
parties to certified checks. Section 3-418 thus has one funda-
mental deficiency: it describes the situation in which a bank
may not rescind certification-when certification is deemed
final-but it fails to describe the situations in which a bank
may rescind because certification is not final.210
205. The text of U.C.C. § 3-418 is quoted in note 45 supra.
206. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
207. U.C.C. § 3-417(1) enumerates the presenter's warranties that are made
to the payor bank by any person who obtains acceptance or payment of a
check. See also U.C.C. § 4-207(1). Under U.C.C. § 3-418, there is an exception to
finality for the recovery of bank payments as provided in Article 4. This excep-
tion is limited, however, to provisional payments made under U.C.C. § 4-301.
208. For purposes of applying the doctrine of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97
Eng. Rep. 871 (1762), acceptance is treated as the equivalent of payment. Thus,
the drawee may not cancel its certification when the holder has in good faith
changed position in reliance on the certification. See Admiral Leather Corp. v.
Manchester Modes, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Kansas Bankers Sur.
Co. v. Ford County State Bank, 184 Kan. 529, 338 P.2d 309 (1959). But see Rock-
land Trust Co. v. South Shore Nat'l Bank, 336 Mass. 74, 314 N.E.2d 438 (1974).
See generally Note, Finality of Payment and the Uniform Commercial Code, 32
TEmP. L.Q. 182 (1959).
209. U.C.C. §§ 3-305 and 3-306 list the claims and defenses to which holders
of negotiable instruments are subject, and the persons who may raise these
claims and defenses.
210. A second deficiency is that although U.C.C. § 4-303(1) (a) makes it clear
that a drawer has no right to issue a stop payment order once a check has been
certified, section 3-418 fails to indicate whether the drawer or a third party may,
by asserting an adverse claim, compel the bank to refuse payment. In the case
of ordinary negotiable instruments, U.C.C. § 3-305(1) provides that a holder in
due course takes free of the claims of any party, and U.C.C. § 3-306(a) provides
that one who is not a holder in due course takes subject to all valid claims of
ownership of any person. There are no similar provisions in the U.C.C. that set-
tle this issue for certified checks. In the absence of guidance from the Code,
courts generally have allowed both drawers and third parties to assert adverse
claims whenever certification is not final. See Admiral Leather Corp. v.
Manchester Modes, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Jefferies & Co. v.
Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Rockland Trust Co. v. South
Shore Nat'l Bank, 336 Mass. 74, 314 N.E.2d 438 (1974); Balducci v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc. 2d 406, 345 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1972), affd
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1. When Certification is Final
Certification is final in favor of holders in due course.
21 1
For persons who do not enjoy this status, it is not clear whether
section 3-418 should be read literally to limit the benefits of
finality to those who have changed position in reliance on the
payment of the check, or whether it should be read broadly to
confer these benefits on persons who have changed position in
reliance on certification as well. Once a bank has paid on a cer-
tified check, there is no longer a question of whether it has the
ability to defeat its obligation to pay; instead, the question be-
comes whether payment was final. Thus, a literal reading of
section 3-418 effectively limits its protection to holders in due
course.
Although both the literal and nonliteral interpretations
have support in case law, 212 reason and history favor the non-
literal approach, which would extend the protection of section
3-418 to those who have changed position in reliance on certifi-
cation. Under common law, certification was final in favor of all
persons who changed position in good faith and in reliance on
it,213 and it does not appear that the draftsmen intended to al-
ter this rule. Furthermore, a rule that limits finality of certifica-
tion to holders in due course would result in a senseless
incongruity between the treatment accorded persons receiving
final payment in cash and those who obtain certification in lieu
of cash. For example, if a seller of goods waited until he cashed
mem., 41 A.D.2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1973); Lincoln Sec. v. Morgan Guar.
Trust Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). Before enactment of the
U.C.C., courts were similarly liberal in permitting the assertion of third-party
claims. See, e.g., Greenberg v. World Exch. Bank, 227 A.D. 413, 237 N.Y.S. 200
(1929); Llop v. First Nat'l Bank, 178 Misc. 436, 35 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
211. Some of the questions encountered in the earlier discussion of whether
the holder of a cashier's check who has notice of the drawer's defenses is still a
holder in due course, see notes 101-109 supra and accompanying text, also pre-
sent themselves here. Because the drawer is released from liability upon certi-
fication procured by the holder, the drawer's defenses on the underlying
transaction would not appear to be defenses to the instrument, and notice of
them would not affect the holder's status. Of course, when certification is pro-
cured by the drawer himself, he is not released, and his defenses on the under-
lying transaction would then be defenses to the instrument. Therefore, they
would constitute notice to the holder under U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (c).
212. Both Admiral Leather Corp. v. Manchester Modes, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), and Balducci v. Merchants Natl Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc. 2d
406, 345 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1972), afrd mem., 41 A.D.2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828
(1973), have interpreted U.C.C. § 3-418 to make certification final as to those
who have changed position in reliance on the certification. However, Rockland
Trust Co. v. South Shore Nat'l Bank, 336 Mass. 74, 314 N.E.2d 438 (1974), limits
the finality of certification to holders in due course.
213. See generally authorities cited in note 197 supra.
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a check before releasing goods to the buyer, the seller would be
able to retain the money as against the bank if the buyer sub-
sequently brought an action against the seller based on the
sale.2 1 4 Yet the same seller would lose in his action for pay-
ment against the bank if he had demanded that the check be
certified, or if he had originally demanded payment by a certi-
fied check, since the bank could then justifiably refuse payment
by raising the buyer's defenses.
Despite the fact that the nonliteral interpretation of section
3-418 is more rational, two serious problems arise when the
benefits of finality are extended to those who have changed po-
sition in reliance on certification: one is the difficulty of apply-
ing the ambiguous reliance standard, and the other is that the
results reached under this interpretation seem inconsistent
with other provisions of the Code. Under the Code, as at com-
mon law, where the holder has procured the certification, the
drawer is released from liability on both the check and on the
underlying obligation. If the holder is not a holder in due
course, and has not changed position in reliance upon the certi-
fication, the bank may rescind its certification simply by assert-
ing that it has not received adequate consideration from the
drawer. This would leave the holder without recourse on the
instrument, since the drawer has already been released,215 and
without a claim capable of overcoming the bank's defense
against the check.
A strong argument can be made that the release of the
drawer is in and of itself a change of position sufficient to make
certification final. 2 16 A problem with this argument, though, is
that every time the holder has had a check certified, the certifi-
cation would be final. Thus, the language of the section would
be largely superfluous. 217 There is a similar problem surround-
214. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Altman, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 815 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966).
215. It must be kept in mind that the drawer is released only when the
holder obtains certification. U.C.C. § 3411(1). See also note 203 supra and ac-
companying text. The drawer remains liable on both the check and the under-
lying obligation if he himself has obtained certification.
216. It is not clear whether the fact that the holder has lost his cause of ac-
tion against the purchaser on the underlying transaction under U.C.C. § 3-
802(1) constitutes a change of position for purposes of U.C.C. § 3-418. Although
there are no post-U.C.C. cases, certain prior cases considered the same ques-
tion involving holder-procured certification and held the discharge of the
drawer to be a sufficient change of position. Times Square Auto. Co. v. Ruther-
ford Nat'l Bank, 77 N.J.L 649, 73 A. 479 (1909); Fiss Corp. v. National Safety
Bank & Trust Co., 191 Misc. 397, 77 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1948).
217. Another argument which might be made is that the holder is not con-
sidered to have changed position, but that the purchaser's liability is reinstated
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ing the questions of whether section 3-418's good faith require-
ment serves only to qualify the holder's action in having the
check certified, or whether it further refers to the holder's hon-
esty in conducting the underlying transaction with the
drawer.218 Unless this good faith requirement is interpreted to
refer only to the holder's actions in obtaining certification, a
holder who knew of a minor defense to payment would be de-
nied the benefits of finality of certification even though the
drawer, who was released from liability by the certification,
would have had only a partial defense to payment.219 None of
these problems are present when the drawer rather than the
holder has procured the certification, though, because then the
drawer remains liable to the holder. 2 °0
2. When Certification is Not Final
Certification is not final when the holder is not a holder in
due course, or has not changed position in reliance on the certi-
fication. Section 3-418 does not indicate which claims or de-
fenses a bank may raise to successfully rescind on those
occasions when its certification is not final. As they have done
with respect to cashier's checks, courts for public policy rea-
sons could simply have denied banks the right to rescind certi-
fication, even when it was not final under section 3-418. Such
an approach would certainly have contributed to the cash
equivalency of certified checks. But, instead, courts have been
uniform in permitting banks to rescind certification whenever it
on the underlying transaction. In certain pre-U.C.C. cases in which the drawee
certified the check despite either insufficient funds in the drawer's account or a
stop payment order issued by the drawer, it was held that since the drawer cre-
ated the situation, he was not released on the check or underlying obligation.
See, e.g., Condenser Serv. & Eng'r Co. v. Mycalex Corp., 7 NJ. Super. 427, 71
A.2d 404 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1950); Baldinger & Kupferman Mfg. Co. v. Manu-
facturers' Citizens' Trust Co., 93 Misc. 94, 156 N.Y.S. 445 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Planta-
tion's Bank v. Desormier, 102 RI. 565, 232 A.2d 371 (1967).
218. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned."
219. For instance, a car dealer might have relinquished possession of a car
in reliance on the receipt of the drawer's check, even though the car dealer
knows of a defense of the drawer (e.g. the auto's defective condition). Suppose
that the drawer has insufficient funds in his account, the bank certifies the
check for the holder by mistake, and the holder is unaware of the bank's mis-
take. If the holder's dishonesty in his transaction with the drawer means that
his change of position in reliance on the certification was not in good faith, he
will lose not only his cause of action against the drawer, U.C.C. § 3-802(1), but
also his cause of action against the bank, even though the drawer has only a
partial defense to payment.
220. See U.C.C. §§ 3-411(1), -802(1); note 203 supra and accompanying text.
19801
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
is not final.22 1 Courts have disagreed, however, on the precise
grounds that justify permitting banks to rescind, and two dis-
tinct theories have been advanced. One theory applies Code
section 3-306. In Rockland Trust Co. v. South Shore National
Bank,222 the court held that if certification is not final under
section 3-418, then the rights of a holder of a certified check are
governed, as in all other cases involving holders who are not
holders in due course, by section 3-306. Under section 3-306, a
bank can raise any of its defenses and any of the drawer's legal
claims of ownership, although the bank may not raise the
drawer's mere defenses. If the bank wishes to assert the
drawer's equitable claims of ownership, section 3-306 requires
that the drawer defend the action for the bank.2
The second and more generally accepted theory224 disre-
gards the Code and looks instead to common law.225 Under the
common law approach, banks have been permitted to rescind
against holders who are not holders in due course and who
have not changed position in reliance on the certification,
whenever the bank has a defense of its own,226 or there is a
third party who has a claim of ownership,227 or the drawer has
a defense arising out of the underlying transaction in which he
negotiated the instrument.228 Some of these courts have gone
221. See generally note 210 supra.
222. 336 Mass. 74, 314 N.E.2d 438 (1974).
223. See notes 122-146 supra and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Admiral Leather Corp. v. Manchester Modes, Inc., 422 F. Supp.
387 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Jefferies & Co. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Balducci v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc. 2d 406, 345
N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1972), affid mem., 41 A.D.2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1973);
Lincoln Sec. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1970).
225. See Admiral Leather Corp. v. Manchester Modes, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Balducci v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc. 2d 406,
345 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1972), affd mem., 41 A.D.2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828
(1973); Lincoln Sec. v. Morgan Guar. Trust, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 215 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1970). All these cases refer to the pre-U.C.C. case of Greenberg v. World
Exch. Bank, 227 A.D. 413, 237 N.Y.S. 200 (1929), and the Lincoln opinion also re-
fers to another pre-U.C.C. case, Llop v. First Nat'l Bank, 178 Misc. 436, 35
N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
226. Although none of the common law cases cited in note 227 infra in-
volved a bank raising its own defenses, this situation presents the strongest
case for permitting a bank to rescind certification.
227. See Jefferies & Co., Inc. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Balducci v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc. 2d 406, 345
N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1972), affid mem., 41 A.D.2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1973);
Lincoln Sec. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1970).
228. See Admiral Leather Corp. v. Manchester Modes, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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even further than the common law. Pointing to the Code's ero-
sion of the distinction between certification procured by draw-
ers and by holders,2 29 at least one court has allowed a bank to
rescind certification on account of a drawer's claim even though
the certification was holder-procured. This rule has the effect
of releasing the drawer from liability both on the check and on
the underlying obligation. 230
A classic example of the liberality with which rescission of
nonfinal certification has been allowed under the common law
theory is Admiral Leather Corp. v. Manchester Modes, Inc.
2 3 1
In Admiral, the drawer had purchased certain goods from the
payee with a personal check. The payee later procured certifi-
cation, thus releasing the drawer from liability both on the con-
tract and on the check. Upon discovering that the goods were
nonconforming, the drawer requested that the bank refuse pay-
ment on the check. The bank agreed after the drawer had un-
dertaken to indemnify it for the costs of the defense. By that
time the drawer had already commenced its own action against
the payee for breach of warranty. Notwithstanding the fact that
the drawer had initiated a separate suit on the underlying
transaction, the court permitted the bank to rescind certifica-
tion if the payee could not show that it had changed position in
reliance upon the certification. By thus consolidating the
drawer's action against the payee and the payee's action
against the bank, the court in effect permitted the bank to raise
the drawer's mere defenses on the underlying transaction.
Since a bank is not obligated to honor its acceptor's con-
tract when payment is not final, a bank may refuse to pay on
the check, and may interplead the drawer and the holder when-
ever the drawer has a claim to or a defense against the
check.2 32 Moreover, if the holder brings an action against the
bank for its voluntary refusal to pay, it appears that the drawer
may intervene.23 3 If the bank is unwilling to refuse payment on
229. See Balducci v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc.2d 406, 345
N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1972), affd mem., 41 A.). 2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1973)
(court permitted drawer to assert its claim of ownership even though holder
had procured certification).
230. See Balducci v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc. 2d 406, 345
N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct 1972), affd mem., 41 A.D. 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1973).
231. 422 F. Supp. 387 (SD.N.Y. 1976).
232. See Balducci v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc. 2d 406, 345
N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1972), affid mem., 41 A.). 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1973);
Lincoln Sec. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1970).
233. Although the question of intervention does not appear to have been
presented in any case, the court in Admiral Leather Corp. v. Manchester
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a check when the holder is subject to third-party claims, under
either the common law or the Code theory, the drawer or an-
other third party may assert an adverse claim of ownership.2
In Jefferies & Co. v. Arkus-Duntov,2 the court granted the
drawer's request to enjoin payment to one who was not a
holder in due course while simultaneously refusing to enjoin
payment to a holder in due course. Once it is acknowledged
that one who is not a holder in due course is subject to third-
party claims of ownership,236 decisions such as Jefferies are
clearly compelledas7
The case law therefore reaches results that are for the most
part consistent with the apparent intent of the draftsmen of the
Code-that the effects of nonfinal certification be the same as
those resulting from nonfinal payment. In the case of nonfinal
payment, banks have an equitable right to restitution of monies
paid by mistake.2  By analogy, then, when a bank has been
fraudulently induced to certify a check, or when it has certified
a check on the mistaken belief that the drawer's account con-
tained sufficient funds, the bank should also have an equitable
right of restitution. And, if a third party has a claim of owner-
ship which it asserts after certification, it appears that since a
bank may not obtain discharge under section 3-603(1), it would
Modes, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 387 (SD.N.Y. 1976), consolidated the holder's action
against a bank and the drawer's action against the holder on the underlying ob-
ligation.
234. The Code theory requires that the adverse claimant either obtain an
injunction against payment or indemnify the bank. U.C.C. § 3-603(1).
235. 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
236. If the holder's title to the instrument is subordinate to the claim of
ownership of the third party, U.C.C. § 3-603(1) seems applicable. This section
permits third parties to assert adverse claims.
237. Under the majority view, since a bank may defeat payment to the
holder by asserting the drawer's mere defense, see text accompanying note 228
supra, there is a question of whether the drawer can enjoin the bank from pay-
ing the holder when the drawer is only asserting a defense to payment based
on the underlying obligation. Certainly, if section 3-306(d) were applied, the in-junction would fail since under that section the bank may raise only the
drawer's claims, and not his defenses. In addition, the bank is not in need of
protection in this situation, since it could obtain a discharge simply by paying
the holder, even with notice of the drawer's defense. See U.C.C. § 3-603(1). But
this does not necessarily resolve the question of whether a court should enjoin
a bank from paying a check under such circumstances. A strong argument can
be made that unless injunctions are available where the drawer has a defense,
banks can arbitrarily determine whether the drawer or holder bears the loss.
This argument is even more appealing considering the fact that since the
drawer would be a party to the action, there would be no danger of inconsistent
results.
238. See Note, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal under Articles Three and Four of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 U. Prrr. L. REV. 198, 198-215 (1961).
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need an equitable right to raise this claim. But the consistency
between the case law and the draftsmen's intent disappears
when the drawer attempts to assert his own defense to pay-
ment. Here, the bank's payment of a certified check would not
expose it to liability under section 3-603(1), nor could the bank
argue that it certified the check by mistake. Thus, based on
analogy to actions premised on the equitable right of restitu-
tion, it appears that cases like Admiral, which in effect permit
banks to raise the mere defenses of the drawer, are erroneous.
Although application of section 3-306 would produce somewhat
similar results, the better analysis of the nonfinal certification
problem would be accomplished by way of reference to nonfi-
nal payment, not reference to section 3-306.
C. THE CURRENT UTILITY OF CERTIFIED CHECKS
Both the common law and Code theories for determining
when a bank may rescind certification generate too many po-
tential costs for holders to allow certified checks to serve as via-
ble cash substitutes. There is a definite discrepancy between
the view expressed by some courts that certified checks are
cash substitutes, and the risks that these same courts are will-
ing to impose upon the checks' holders. The case of Jefferies &
Co. v. Arkus-Duntov,2 9 in which the same result would have
been reached under either the common law or Code theory, is
instructive. In Jefferies, the court enjoined payment to one who
was not holder in due course, and refused to enjoin payment to
a holder in due course, reasoning.
Aside from the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code, equity
should, for policy reasons, refrain from interfering with the free flow of
commerce. The integrity of the certified check is a valuable asset in
our economy. An innocent holder should not be disturbed in his right-
ful possession, though the result may mean a windfall for the customer
whose loan has been repaid by the questionable means described.240
In Jefferies, the court failed to realize that permitting a
third party to enjoin payment when a certified check is held by
one who is not a holder in due course, or allowing the bank to
raise its own or the drawer's defenses under those same cir-
cumstances, destroys the "integrity" of certified checks. Fur-
thermore, the court's decision forced the payee bank, which
was ultimately found to be a holder in due course, to expend
substantial time and money in judicially establishing that fact.
Despite its success in court, therefore, the bank realized an
239. 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
240. Id. at 1217.
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amount substantially less than if it had simply required pay-
ment in cash.
The inefficiency caused by Jefferies is obvious. First, the
payee bank was not a party to the transaction in which the
third party's defenses arose. Thus, if the bank had been paid in
cash, it would have incurred no expenses whatsoever, and, of
course, could not have been made party to an action arising
from the underlying transaction. Since it took a certified check,
however, the payee bank was forced into litigation. Second, re-
gardless of whether the payee bank was subject to an action by
a third party based on the underlying transaction, the court's
decision to permit a third party to enjoin payment and to allow
the drawee bank to raise the drawer's or its own defenses un-
necessarily shifts the costs of instituting litigation to the holder
in addition to depriving him of the use of funds during litiga-
tion. Shifting the burden of commencing litigation to holders
may actually increase the frequency of banks' willingness to re-
fuse payment. Indeed, if a bank were under the impression
that the holder might not be protected by section 3-418, it would
be good business for the bank to refuse payment and force the
holder to commence an action establishing his right to pay-
ment. No penalty would be assessed against the bank for its
actions, yet the bank would gain substantial bargaining power
for persuading the holder to settle at an amount lower than the
face value of the check.
Because of these risks, holders should instead require pay-
ment either by cash or by cashier's check, since courts almost
uniformly deny banks the right to defeat payment on cashier's
checks.24 1 This situation raises the question of what role re-
mains for certified checks. Since certain statutes require their
use, certified checks still serve a purpose,2 42 albeit limited. In
addition, certified checks do provide a more solvent obligor
than do uncertified checks. Yet if banks are permitted to re-
scind certification whenever they have a defense, this protec-
tion is certainly diluted.
Considering that banks are phasing out the use of certified
checks and replacing them with cashier's checks,243 perhaps
the courts and the draftsmen of the Code should simply as-
sume that certified checks will fade out of use. But if legisla-
tures and the public continue to demand that certified checks
241. See cases cited in note 47 supra.
242. See note 187 supra.
243. See H. BAILEY, supra note 182, § 10.1.
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be used in lieu of cash, the Code should provide for this role.
Because of the Code's explicit provisions concerning finality of
certification, courts cannot treat certified checks in the same
manner as they treat cashier's checks. Consequently, if certi-
fied checks are to remain in use, the Code should be amended
to give to the holders of certified checks the same protection
that most courts accord the holders of cashier's checks.
V. TELLER'S CHECKS
A. THE NATURE OF TELLER'S CHECKS
Teller's checks are checks drawn by a bank-usually a sav-
ings and loan association-upon a commercial bank.244 Teller's
checks serve two functions: they are used as personal checks
by savings and loan associations, and are used as cash
equivalents by purchasers of the checks. The present uses of
teller's checks thus parallel those of cashier's checks. Since
savings and loan associations cannot provide checking services,
they must use teller's checks drawn upon commercial banks in
situations where commercial banks would simply issue their
own cashier's checks.245
The Code treats teller's checks as if they were ordinary
personal checks, regarding the fact that the drawer is a bank as
merely incidental. The drawer bank has the obligation to pay
the amount of the check upon receipt of any necessary notice
of dishonor.246 The drawee bank, on the other hand, is not lia-
ble until it accepts the check.247 The drawer bank has the right
to stop payment on the check,248 since it is a customer of the
drawee bank.249 The drawer bank may exercise this right when
it has a defense arising out of the issuance of the check, or sim-
ply as an accommodation to the purchaser of the teller's check
if the purchaser has a claim or defense arising from his negotia-
tion of the instrument.250 If the drawer bank will not volunta-
rily stop payment on the check at the purchaser's request, the
244. See Note, supra note 31, at 524.
245. Both federal and state law prohibit savings and loan associations from
engaging in checking accounts. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(b) (1) (West Supp.
1979); CAT. FIN. CODE § 5003 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. BANKnG LAW §§ 378-383
(McKinney Supp. 1979).
246. U.C.C. § 3413 (2).
247. Id. § 3-409(1).
248. Id. § 4-403(1).
249. Id. § 4-104(e).
250. The purchaser of a teller's check has no right to order payment
stopped. Under U.C.C. § 4-403(1), a customer may stop payment only on an
"item payable for his account." A teller's check is for the account of the drawer
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
purchaser may still retard payment by asserting an adverse
claim.251
When a teller's check is dishonored by the drawee bank,
the holder must sue the drawer bank on its obligation under
section 3-413(2). Against a holder in due course, a bank may
defeat payment only if it has a real defense or if it has a per-
sonal defense and has dealt with the holder. 5 2 If the holder is
not a holder in due course, the bank may raise any of its own
defenses and any legal claims of ownership of third parties.2
It may also raise the equitable claims of a third party if that
party defends the action for the bank.2 4 The bank, however,
may not raise the mere defenses of a third party.255
Even though the Code manifests an apparent intention to
treat teller's checks as personal checks,25 6 it is doubtful
whether the two distinct functions257 that the business commu-
nity assigns teller's checks were considered when this decision
was made. If teller's checks were in fact used merely as the
personal checks of drawer banks, it would be entirely proper to
give drawer banks the rights of any other drawer of an ordinary
negotiable instrument. If, however, teller's checks are to serve
as cash substitutes as well, it is improper to give drawer banks
the same protection accorded drawers of ordinary personal
checks. This protection simply imposes too many risks on
holders of teller's checks for the checks to have any semblance
of cash equivalency.
Courts have recognized the problems created by the dual
function of teller's checks:258
The plaintiff accepted a [teller's check] as in the nature of cash. This
is a procedure that is widely followed in business transactions of many
varieties throughout this area .... A teller's check has generally been
treated as "cash."... It seems to me that the defense urged by the
defendant would be applicable only where the bank issuing the teller's
check is an actual party to a transaction. I
bank, not for the purchaser/remitter. See aso U.C.C. § 4403, Official Comment
5.
251. U.C.C. §§ 3-603(1), -306(d).
252. Id. § 3-305(2).
253. Id. § 3-306(b) to (d).
254. Id. § 3-306(d).
255. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
256. See U.C.C. §§ 4-104(e), -403(1).
257. See text accompanying notes 244-245 supra.
258. See, e.g., Manhattan Imported Cars, Inc. v. Dime Say. Bank, 70 Misc. 2d
889, 335 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Term 1972); Rubin v. Walt Whitman Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 610 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Meckler v. Highland
Falls Say. & Loan Ass'n, 64 Misc. 2d 407, 314 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Ruskin
v. Central Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966);
Malphrus v. Home Say. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
[Vol. 64:275
BANK CHECKS
For example, if the defendant savings bank were engaged in a con-
tract for the purchase of property, equipment, etc., it would be re-
garded as the actual obligor in the transaction and could stop payment
if it discovered fraud or a question arose as to the consideration, etc., in
the same manner as any individual could stop payment. Here, how-
ever, the defendant savings bank, in effect, sold an instrument which
was used exactly as one might use cash or a certified check. The de-
fendant savings bank was in no sense a party to the transaction be-
tween the plaintiff and [the person who paid with the teller's
check].259
In an attempt to reconcile the dual functions of teller's checks,
the courts of New York have consistently denied drawer banks
the right to raise any claims or defenses of third parties,260
while at the same time permitting banks to raise their own de-
fenses whenever they could do so if the check were regarded as
an ordinary personal check.261 Of course, allowing a drawer
bank to raise its own defenses when the check is being used by
the purchaser in the nature of cash renders even this treatment
of teller's checks inadequate to preserve true cash equivalency.
In fact, it is impossible to devise a set of rules that can
completely reconcile both functions of teller's checks. The very
characteristics that must be present in order for a drawer bank
to have the same rights as the drawer of an ordinary personal
check are the ones that destroy the ability of teller's checks to
serve as cash substitutes. One of these two contradictory func-
tions should be selected for teller's checks, and the Code
should specifically assure that function. Since cashier's checks
serve primarily as cash substitutes, it is sensible to designate
teller's checks as the personal checks of banks. An advantage
of this approach is that no amendments would be necessary,
since the Code already treats teller's checks in this fashion. If
this course were taken, however, the courts, the public, and
even banks would have to be reeducated, since many of them
currently consider teller's checks as cash equivalents similar in
nature to cashier's checks.
259. Malphrus v. Home Sav. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 706-07, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980,
982-83 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
260. See Manhattan Imported Cars, Inc. v. Dime Say. Bank, 70 Misc. 2d 889,
335 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Term 1972); Meckler v. Highland Falls Say. & Loan Ass'n,
64 Misc. 2d 407, 314 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Ruskin v. Central Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Malphrus v. Home Say.
Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
261. See Rubin v. Walt Whitman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 21 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 610 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Smith v. New York Bank for Sav, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
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B. THE BANK'S RIGHT TO RAISE THE PURCHASER'S OR ITS OWN
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
There are two separate lines of decisions dealing with the
issue of whether a drawer bank should be permitted to raise
the purchaser's claims or defenses against a teller's check. One
applies Code section 3-306(d) ,262 while the other views teller's
checks as cash equivalents and flatly denies banks the right to
raise any claims or defenses of the purchaser.263
Under the first line of cases, if the holder brings a suit
against the drawer bank, the bank may raise third-party claims
of ownership but may not raise third-party defenses.26 In
Fulton National Bank v. Delco Corp.,265 the drawer bank, at the
request of the purchaser, ordered the drawee bank to stop pay-
ment on a teller's check. The court allowed the drawer bank to
raise the purchaser's equitable claims of ownership.266 In justi-
fying its application of section 3-306(d) to this problem, the
Fulton court noted the section's technical applicability,2 67 and
added that allowing all claims to be adjudicated in one action
would avoid a multiplicity of suits.268
A correlate to the application of section 3-306(d) is the abil-
ity of third-party claimants to assert adverse claims under sec-
tion 3-603(1). Although the Code permits third parties to assert
adverse claims, it is not clear what procedural steps they must
take in order to comply with section 3-603(1). For instance, in
the case of a promissory note, a claimant must assert his claim
against the maker who, in turn, seeks a discharge by paying the
262. See Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Delco Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455
(1973).
263. See cases cited in note 260 supra.
264. See notes 122-130 supra and accompanying text.
265. 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455 (1973).
266. It should be noted that the purchaser was a party to the action.
267. In holding that the bank's liability on a teller's check is governed by
U.C.C. § 3-306(d), the Fulton court distinguished teller's checks, which it held
to be mere orders from the drawer bank to the drawee bank, from cashier's
checks, which it held to be notes carrying an unconditional promise to pay. It
also distinguished teller's checks from certified checks, which it held to be ac-
cepted drafts. 128 Ga. App. at 18, 195 S.E.2d at 456. Although this might be a
proper literal application of the Code, it is interesting that the court was not
disturbed by the fact that teller's checks and cashier's checks are functional
equivalents.
268. 128 Ga. App. at 20, 195 S.E.2d at 457-58. The court's argument that per-
mitting banks to raise the purchaser's claims avoids a multiplicity of suits is
unpersuasive. Only in the instant case would an additional suit be avoided.
Normally, if the court refused to permit the bank its right to raise the pur-
chaser's claims, the bank would have no independent reason to refuse payment
of a teller's check. Then, only one lawsuit would exist--that between the pur-
chaser and the holder.
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holder. The claimant's act of either indemnifying the maker or
obtaining an injunction will deprive the maker of his ability to
achieve discharge by paying the holder. In the case of a teller's
check, however, the party seeking discharge is the drawer
bank, while the party who must make the payment is the
drawee bank. As a result, there is significant ambiguity regard-
ing which party must be indemnified or enjoined.269
Application of sections 3-306(d) and 3-603(1) poses the
same practical problems for teller's checks as it does for cash-
ier's checks. On the one hand, the purchaser of a teller's check
is given only limited protection: he may raise his claim of own-
ership, but not his defenses to payment. On the other hand, al-
lowing even this limited protection seriously undermines the
cash equivalency of teller's checks. Recognizing the Code's del-
eterious effect on the capacity of teller's checks to serve as cash
substitutes, a line of decisions in New York has flatly rejected
its applicability.270 Beginning with the case of Malphrus v.
Home Savings Bank,271 the New York courts have attempted to
guarantee teller's checks cash-equivalent status. In fact, these
courts have succeeded to the extent that they disallow the as-
sertion of all third-party claims and defenses.272
One problem with the New York decisions lies in the rea-
soning the courts have employed. The courts posit that be-
cause under section 3-802(1) the purchaser obtains a discharge
on the underlying obligation when the holder receives the
teller's check in payment of that obligation, it would be unfair
to permit the drawer bank to raise the purchaser's defenses af-
ter he has been discharged.273 This argument is unconvincing
269. See Note, supra note 31, at 545-46. It appears that the only logical read-
ing of U.C.C. § 3-603(1) would require the remitter to assert an adverse claim to
the drawer bank, which is the only party seeking discharge, and require the
drawer bank to issue a stop payment order.
270. See cases cited in note 260 supra.
271. 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
272. Finding, as these courts have, that all holders take teller's checks free
from third-party claims of ownership means that there is no possibility of a
third party ever having an adverse claim to assert under U.C.C. § 3-603(1). This
result was noted in Ruskin v. Central Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966):
It is clear that the defendant [drawer bank] is primarily liable to the
plaintiff [holder] and is not a stakeholder besieged by adverse claim-
ants since under the circumstances presented the bank could not be li-
able to its depositor [purchaser]. The rights of the depositor as against
plaintiff on the underlying transaction should be determined in a sepa-
rate lawsuit.
Id. at 152.
273. See cases cited in note 260 supra.
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because allowing interposition of the purchaser's defenses does
not treat the holder unfairly, but simply limits the holder's re-
covery. In other words, the purchaser would not be totally de-
nied recovery against the bank. Rather, he would be denied
recovery only to the extent that the purchaser's claim is valid.
Under these decisions, even if the holder fully recovers against
the bank, he would still be liable to the purchaser in a subse-
quent action for the same damages.274
Obviously, if teller's checks are to serve as cash equiv-
alents, the Code must be amended. However, it is not likely
that amending the Code to comport with the New York deci-
sions-which merely disallow the assertion of third-party
claims and defenses-would guarantee cash-equivalent status
for teller's checks. The New York approach ignores the delete-
rious impact of continuing to allow the drawer bank to raise its
own defenses.
Using teller's checks both as cash substitutes and as the
personal checks of banks is impossible when banks can raise
their own defenses to payment. If the party who originally re-
ceived the teller's check from the bank still holds it, no real
problem exists, since a bank may raise its own defenses against
one with whom it has dealt even if the person accepted the
check in the nature of cash. Moreover, the bank could raise its
complaint as a counterclaim in the holder's action for pay-
ment.275 But once the original recipient has transferred the
check, insurmountable problems arise. The transferee may
well have accepted the teller's check from the previous holder
as if it were in the nature of cash, and with no knowledge of
any irregularities in the transaction in which his transferor ob-
tained the check. Permitting a bank to raise its own defenses
against a transferee in this situation would have as potentially
serious an impact upon cash equivalency as would permitting
the bank to raise the purchaser's defenses. In both cases, the
holder must bear the risk of litigation and the risk of loss of the
use of the funds. 276
Nevertheless, the courts, including those following Mal-
274. Even if the holder had not dealt with the purchaser and therefore
would not otherwise have been subject to the purchaser's claims or defenses,
the holder would still be made whole since he has a breach of warranty action
against his transferor under U.C.C. § 3-417(2) (d), which provides that "no de-
fense of any party is good against [the purchaser]."
275. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
276. See notes 110-114 supra and accompanying text.
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phrus,2 V look to sections 3-305 and 3-306 to determine whether
a bank may raise its own defenses against a holder.278 Under
these sections, a bank may raise its own defenses against any
holder except a holder in due course with whom it has not
dealt. For example, in Rubin v. Walt Whitman Savings & Loan
Association,279 the court cited Malphrus with approval and al-
lowed the bank to raise the defense, against a transferee of the
purchaser, that the bank had by mistake issued a teller's check
in the wrong amount. Although it is likely that the transferee
took the check as a cash substitute, he found himself subject to
the defense of the bank, despite his unawareness of and lack of
responsibility for the defense. The tacit rationale for this treat-
ment is that if courts deny banks the right to raise their own
defenses, teller's checks cannot adequately serve as the per-
sonal checks of banks because the drawer bank would have no
ability to defeat its obligation to pay.
C. A PROPOSED ROLE FOR TELLER'S CHECKS
It is imperative that some determination be made regard-
ing the most efficient use of teller's checks. The Code could be
amended so that teller's checks would function as cash substi-
tutes. This would require substantial revisions, including one
that would bar the drawer's right to assert its own defenses.
Barring these defenses is a step, however, that even the courts
following Malphrus have been unwilling to take. Amending the
Code in this fashion would also result in a great deal of overlap
between the functions of teller's checks and cashier's checks.
It appears that teller's checks would be better utilized if they
served only a single purpose-that of the personal checks of
banks. The existence of such an instrument would permit
banks to issue teller's checks instead of cashier's checks when-
ever they wish to retain the right to stop payment and to raise
their own defenses. Furthermore, since the Code already treats
teller's checks as the personal checks of the drawer bank, no
revision of the Code would be required.
VL CONCLUSION
The Uniform Commercial Code must provide a framework
in which business transactions can be carried out in a cost-ef-
fective manner. Moreover, the rules governing negotiable in-
277. See text accompanying note 271 supra.
278. See cases cited in note 261 supra.
279. 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 610 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
struments should reflect careful value judgments regarding the
most desirable role for each particular instrument, and should
precisely define the rights and liabilities of the parties to the
various types of checks and notes that circulate in our econ-
omy. Articles 3 and 4 fail to offer the comprehensive frame-
work that the modern business community needs. The
provisions of these articles too often treat negotiable instru-
ments as a homogeneous group and fail to recognize the pecu-
liar functions that our economy has assigned each separate
instrument. This failure is most apparent with regard to the
Code's treatment of bank checks.
Bank checks can potentially serve two important functions
in the economy. Primarily, bank checks can be utilized as cash
substitutes, offering the finality of payment in cash while at the
same time insulating the transacting parties from the risk of
loss. Additionally, bank checks can serve as the personal
checks of banks. The Uniform Commercial Code totally ignores
these two distinct roles of bank checks and therefore should be
revised.
Since it is impossible for a single instrument to serve the
conflicting roles of cash equivalent and personal check, the
Code should explicitly assign only one role to each instrument.
Cashier's checks should be clearly defined as cash equivalents,
and teller's checks should continue to serve as the personal
checks of banks. Certified checks, already obsolescent because
of problems in processing, should be phased out of use alto-
gether. Such revisions would lend more certainty to transac-
tions involving commercial paper and would rationalize the
functions of the bewildering variety of negotiable instruments
that are available for use in modern commercial transactions.
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